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INTRODUCTION
Marriage' is an institution that pervades all aspects of life. Often
marriage is considered a foundational unit of civilized society,' but it
is also an anchor for an individual's identity.3 One is married when in
the office, at a business lunch, or at a conference. One is married at
the tennis tournament, at the benefit dinner, or at the church musical.
One is married while brushing teeth, driving a car, or writing in a
journal. One is married wherever one is, whatever hat one's wearing,
and whether one's task is grand or mundane. Marriage is legal, relig-
ious, social, vocational, and personal. Marriage goes beyond the
shared home and the shared bank account or the anniversary parties.
Marriage insists on being everywhere and transcends all of its defini-
dons. Marriage is reified by the people whose lives are marked with its
label. Marriage finds its power in the identity which individuals bring
to it and the identity individuals find within it. The power of mar-
riage comes not from what it is in the abstract, or how it is defined, or
even what it symbolizes, but from how it is transubstantiated by soci-
ety's focus on marital status as a key element in defining every person.
The issue of same-gender marriage,4 then, is not about laws or
judicial legislation or social opinion; it is much more personal than
1. Although I use the term "marriage" throughout the paper to encompass many literal
and connotative definitions, I attempt to reach beyond the meanings related to civil
contract, social institution, status, and personal relationship toward the effect of its
label on the individuals included in and excluded from the legal coupling called
"marriage."
2. See Morris v. Morris, 220 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591 (Sup. Ct. 1961) ("Marriage is not
merely a civil contract, but a foundation upon which society depends for its very sur-
vival.").
3. See MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PuRsuIT OF INTIMACY 4, 9 (1993)
(defining relational identity as "a sense of oneself" derived from one's relationships
with others and defining status as a "formal expression of the behavior expected" of
one who occupies a specific role or has a certain legal identity). Regan's ideas as expli-
cated in his book served as a significant inspiration in the conceptual organization of
the thoughts expressed in this Article.
4. At the expense of variety, I have chosen to use the term "same-gender marriage" over
"gay marriage" or "same-sex marriage" (except in direct quotations) because I believe
it is more descriptive of the relationships at issue and focuses on the only distinction
pertinent to this discussion between those couples now legally allowed to marry and
those not. For example, a person of any sexual or affectional orientation is allowed to
enter legal marriage, as long as she or he marries someone of the opposite gender.
Also, the distinction is not derived from differences in commitment or sexual rela-
tions, as society has no accurate way of measuring or monitoring such differences
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that. Same-gender marriage is about people searching for integrated
identities and others jealously and fearfully guarding their own. Awk-
wardly rooted in religion, doctrine, tradition, and law, the debate is so
personal that every time the subject is broached the parties to the con-
versation are inevitably led to an encounter with the mirror image of
their own identities, regardless of marital status or affectional orienta-
tion.5 The position of this Article is that a simplistic definition of
marriage, which insists that only one man and one woman can enter
into matrimony, gives the excuse to avoid this uncomfortable self-
examination. If the surface image does not match this simplistic defi-
nition, then no marriage is possible regardless of commitment and
love. If the image does match, then the love and commitment are as-
sumed. This out-of-hand dismissal of same-gender marriage denies
society the opportunity for any thoughtful exploration of the meaning
of marriage. The opposite-gender couple may be unwilling to explore
the reflection of their relationship, but the same-gender couple is
faced with three reflections-each partner's public image and their
shared private identity. The same-gender couple must understand
each and take on the identity suitable to his/her current environment.
Marriage integrates public and private life. For example, if same-
gender marriage were legal and socially acceptable, no longer would a
lesbian have to appear single at work, church, or public events, and
then go home to the woman with whom she secretly shares her love
and her private life. Individuals in a same-gender couple, who are
forced by society to maintain stoic facades in spite of deep feelings for
each other, undoubtedly are susceptible to stress as a result of feeling
forced to explain to outsiders their intense responses to events in one
another's life or to milestones in their "friendship."
Integration of the public and private lives of gay men and lesbi-6
ans, not simply integration into society, is a key aspect of the
symbolic meaning and of the desired effect of same-gender marriage.
Yet, the question for many heterosexuals is whether, by broadening
between any two couples except that speculation provides fodder for gossip. Likewise,
I use "same-gender couples" over "same-sex couples" or "gay couples."
5. I use "affectional orientation" or "sexual orientation" to refer to a person's dominant
physical or emotional attraction to one gender or the other.
6. For the sake of consistency, I use "gay men" and "lesbians" to refer to persons at-
tracted to others of the same gender.
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the access to marriage, they are robbed of something that holds to-
gether their identities.7
Even among authors who support same-gender coupling, views
differ widely when it comes to the topic of same-gender marriage.
Some have addressed the issue in terms of how gay couples are enti-
ded to be fitted for the marriage model, focusing primarily on a rights
argument! Others have asserted that marriage is not suitable to gay
relationships and is not even something homosexuals should want.9
Finally, a third group has argued that the inclusion of same-gender
couples can improve the institution of marriage."0 Other authors
agree, albeit through very different reasoning, that marriage could not
endure this change and remain substantially the same; these authors
fear the change would have a deleterious effect on heterosexual mar-
riage and, thereby, society as a whole. " I agree that same-gender
7. See Richard D. Mohr, The Stakes in the Gay-Marriage Wars, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE:
THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 105, 106-7 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosen-
baum eds., 1997) [hereinafter THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE]; see also Same-Sex
Marriage: Hearings on S. 1740 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong.
(1996) (statement of Congressman Steve Largent).
8. See, e.g., Otis R. Damslet, Note, Same-Sex Marriage, 10 N.Y.L. ScH. J. Hum. RTs.
555, 556 (1993) (asserting that "state constitutional rights require that same-sex mar-
riages receive protection equal to that accorded opposite-sex marriages"); Ed Fallon, I
Have Anguished, in THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE, supra note 7, at 182, 185
(Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1997) (exhorting his Iowa House of
Representatives colleagues to take leadership roles in spite of public opinion and vote
down a bill explicitly disallowing same-gender marriage); Cindy Tobisman, Marriage
vs. Domestic Partnership: Will We Ever Protect Lesbians' Families?, 12 Bmut.avY
WOMEN'S L.J. 112 (1997) (focusing on the injustices encountered by lesbian families
in the absence of legalized same-gender marriage); Developments in the Law--Sexual
Orientation and the Law, 102 HARv. L. Rnv. 1508, 1603-29 (1989) (opining that
fairness dictates changes in the law to eliminate the discrimination against same-
gender couples that comes in the form of denying them access to marriage).
9. See, e.g., Frank Browning, Why Marry?, in SAME-S.x MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON: A
REA6ER 132 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997) [hereinafter SAME-SEx MARRIAG.]; Paula
Ettelbrick, Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in SAmE-SEx MARRIAGE su-
praat 118, 120-24.
10. See, e.g., Richard D. Mohr, The Case for Gay Marriage, 9 NOTRE DAMP J.L. ETmics
& PUB. Por'y 215, 218 (1995) (asserting, among other things, that a lesser commit-
ment to monogamy and an acceptance that relationships evolve could improve
opposite-gender marriages); Andrew Sullivan, Virtually Normal, in THE MORAL AND
LEGAL DEBATE, supra note 7, at 126, 130 (suggesting that same-gender couples are
"sustained more powerfully by genuine commitment" because they have survived
without institutional models).
11. See, e.g., Jeffrey Hart, Adam and Eve, Not Adam and Henry, in THE MORAL AND
LEGAL. DEBATE, supra note 7, at 30 (emphasizing that "females and males are natu-
rally complementary" and that, along with a "millenia of human experience," this
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couples do not fit the marriage model perfectly, but I disagree with
some of these authors as to why that is or how to proceed in providing
same-gender couples equal support and recognition.
I am concerned that moving too quickly on legalization of same-
gender marriage disregards the feelings of a large segment of the
American population and puts same-gender couples at risk. The more
prudent and, perhaps, wiser course of action is to acknowledge and
accept the fears of opposite-gender couples, to encourage reflective
discourse, to increase gradually the visibility of same-gender couples
on a local, individual scale, and to foster support within the general
public. Then, when same-gender marriage is legalized, the backlash
out of fear and resentment will be minimized. American law has
proven to be flexible over time, but changes often have come slowly,
after many people have brought injustices to the attention of the
courts and legislatures. Common law development of torts such as
battery, assault, conversion, defamation, invasion of privacy, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, and sexual harassment provide
examples, although not perfectly analogous, of this long process. Only
six suits that have directly challenged the denial of marriage to same-
gender couples have made it to the appellate level of our court sys-
tems. 12 Same-gender marriage cannot be initiated as fad or test
legislation, but requires the commitment of the state, and ultimately
the nation, to a joint life for the couple (or until a state-recognized
divorce or annulment). 3 Reluctantly, therefore, I suggest that the
process take precedence over fairness for now. I advocate for patience,
understanding, and tolerance on the part of same-gender couples so
society as a whole can move closer to a consensus of support and un-
derstanding rather than using our legal system as a weapon to force
acceptance.
This Article will examine why so much is at stake in the political,
social, and legal debate over same-gender marriage. It will not address
demonstrates the inability to use "marriage" in reference to same-gender couples);
Robert H. Knight, How Domestic Partnerships and "Gay Marriage" Threaten the Fam-
ily, in THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE, supra note 7, at 108 (listing the
legitimization of "same-sex activity," injury to the "crucial kinship structure," and
violation of religious freedom among his reasons to oppose same-gender partner
benefits or marriage); Cal Thomas, Marriagefrom God, Not Courts, in THE MORAL
AND LEGAL DEBATE, supra note 7, at 42 (claiming that same-gender marriage "goes
against the author of marriage, legal precedent," and common sense).
12. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
13. See 52 Ama. JuR. 2D Marriage § 6 (1970) (stating that "[a] central characteristic of the
contract of marriage is its permanence").
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the constitutional questions of whether there is a fundamental right to
marry, although persuasive arguments have been advanced from both
sides of the debate."4 This Article will focus on a more introspective
view of the potential effects of legalizing same-gender marriage on the
identities of gay men and lesbians in committed relationships and on
the interaction between same-gender couples and society. Marriage
would provide the integration' sought by gay men and lesbians, but at
the expense of significant social quandary. In Part I, this paper will
dissect the meaning of marriage into its relational, traditional, and
Christian aspects." Part II will explore the legal and constitutive
qualities of same-gender marriage. Part III will discuss the impact of
the law of marriage in its present form on the identities of gay men
and lesbians, as they see themselves and as society views them. Part IV
will look at how legalization of same-gender marriages might change
the self-perception of gay couples, what legal benefits it would confer,
and how the heterosexual majority might respond. This Article will
conclude that the legalization of same-gender marriage is too big of a
step and will suggest, instead, enactment of smaller benefits packages
to mitigate economic and legal discrimination against same-gender
couples, while society prepares for same-gender "marriage."
I. THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE
"Marriage, n. [a] community consisting of a master, a mistress and
two slaves, making in all, two. "16
14. See, e.g., Damslet, supra note 8 (surveying the history of same-gender marriage and
recent case law, and concluding that prohibiting same-gender marriage is a denial of
equal protection); Jennifer L. Heeb, Comment, Homosexual Marriage, the Changing
American Family, and the Heterosexual Right to Privacy, 24 SETON HALL L. RaV. 347
(1993) (discussing the rights and privileges of married couples and the inadequacy of
alternatives available to same-gender couples, concluding that only recognizing same-
gender marriage will give gay men and lesbians equal protection under the law). But
see Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Mar-
riage, 1996 BYU L. Ray. 1 (1996) (arguing that there is no constitutional basis for
recognizing same-gender marriage because it is not protected by the privacy right
doctrine and because sexual orientation is distinguishable from the protected catego-
ries of race and gender).
15. Although all religious faiths recognize marriage or a marriage-like relationship, this
Article focuses on the Christian roots of marriage because the United States is a pre-
dominantly Christian country.
16. AMBROsE BiERCE, THE DmiL's DicnoNA Y 118 (1906).
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A. Marriage As Relational
A dictionary provides very little assistance in uncovering what
marriage means to society. The first definition listed in one com-
monly used dictionary is "the state of being married; relation between
husband and wife.... The dictionary does have a secondary
meaning often forgotten: "any close or intimate union.... ,8 Regard-
less of this oversight, the personal relationship between two people,
not simply their status as married persons, is the lifeblood of marriage.
For greater insight into marriage, one must turn to marriage's conno-
tative components and its assumed, but definitionally absent,
requirement of love. This Article offers the following definition of
marriage: A committed relationship between two persons, formalized
by society, and with traditional, religious, and legal roots.
First and foremost, marriage requires a commitment to a rela-
tionship. The key is to be committed to the process of loving one
another, not to the other person him/herself.9 Because relationships
are abstract and people are tangible, this is very difficult for a concrete-
thinking society.20 The view that relationships are external to the con-
crete, warm-bodied individuals who have them ignores the social or
relational self.2' The rational self is the part of an individual's identity
that internalizes society and influences society.22 Any relationship can
be as real and alive as the individuals, but it is not a separate entity
outside of them.' It is the ongoing, everchanging experience of one
another. The expression "the two shall become one" does not mean
that they will ever "be" one, but that they will be committed to the
process of "becoming" one. To be committed to the relationship is a
willingness to share oneself with and to open oneself to the other, a
willingness to effect change and to be changed. 24 Vhen an individual
commits oneself to another individual rather than to the process, the
relationship is at risk, because a person changes over time and the
17. WEBSTER'S NEw WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH 829 (3d College ed.
1994) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S].
18. WEBSTER'S, supra note 17, at 829.
19. See Bernard M. Loomer, On Committing Yourself to a Relationship, 16 PRoCEs STrUD.
255 (1987).
20. See Loomer, supra note 19, at 255.
21. See Loomer, supra note 19, at 255.
22. See Loomer, supra note 19, at 255.
23. See Loomer, supra note 19, at 255-56.
24. See Loomer, supra note 19, at 260.
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person to whom one initially committed will disappear over time. 5
The commitment to the relationship is what allows the couple to learn
to grow together by placing trust in something which is not expected
to remain static.26 In fact, the relationship is the very means for ad-
justing to change in each other and in the world. In theory, marriage
is the social acknowledgement of and support for two people's com-
mitment to a relationship.
In practice, legal and religious recognition has not required that
the two parties to the marriage be in love or even that they be more
than representatives of the actual parties to the relationship. 27 History
is replete with marriages of convenience, arranged marriages, mar-
riages as business mergers, and marriages for property.28 Nonetheless,
some relationship between two persons, whether romantic, familial,
class-based, or business, is the cornerstone of the marriage definition.
Americans are most familiar with the ideal of marriage for love, and
proponents of same-gender marriage focus on the similarity between
homosexual love and heterosexual love.29 As difficult as it may be for
persons of differing sexual orientations to imagine, the attraction be-
tween the two involved in a homosexual relationship is fundamentally
25. See Loomer, supra note 19, at 261.
26. See Loomer, supra note 19, at 261.
27. See, e.g., UNF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 207 (listing prohibited marriages,
without including marriages entered into in the absence of deep sentiment between
the parties); UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIvoRcE Acr § 208(a) (listing the circumstances
which invalidate a marriage, again without including those entered into in the ab-
sence of mutual love). Consent, a qualification for licensing in most states, comes the
closest to requiring any sentiment whatsoever. See e.g., CA. F m. CODE ANN. § 300
(West 1994); N.Y. DoM. REL. L. § 10 (McKinney 1988); UNip. MARRIAGE AND DI-
VORCE ACT § 201 (1973).
28. See, e.g., Onyeme v. INS, No. 96-2257, 1998 WL 290223 (4th Cir. June 5, 1998)
(denying review of deportation issued to a Nigerian who submitted a fraudulent di-
vorce decree to the immigration service so that he could marry a U.S. citizen); United
States v. Sprei, No. 97-1206, 1998 WL 272629 (2d Cir. May 28, 1998) (vacating a
lesser sentence handed down by the lower court, which had based its decision on the
defendant's responsibility as an Orthodox Jew to arrange his children's marriages and
how his imprisonment would harm their marital options); In re Marriage of Nne-
bedum, No. CO-97-1884, 1998 WL 279215 (Minn. Ct. App. June 2, 1998) (ruling
on dissolution petition in case involving a marriage for immigration purposes);
United States v. Owen, 47 M.J. 501 (C.M.A. 1997) (finding, in a murder trial, the
marriage between defendant and another soldier to be one of convenience to improve
and increase service benefits).
29. See, e.g., Joseph Landau, Marriage as Integration, in SAME-SEx MARIAGE, supra note
9, at 323 (assuming the common sentiment of love in arguing that the institution of
marriage could integrate gay men and lesbians into society at large).
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the same as the attraction between the two involved in a heterosexual
relationship.
For an understanding of why humans are relational, people have
looked to religious texts such as the Old Testament. Interpretations of
the creation of Eve as a partner for Adam have long purported to
answer why women and men are attracted to one another and to jus-
tify the belief that homosexuality is not natural.' Another
interpretation of that scripture focuses on the general truth, rather
than the specific truth, which it conveys.3 According to one speaker,
"[t]his story tells me that, as a human being, I am constituted by my
relationships of mutuality and intimacy with other persons." 33 We are
not intended to be alone because "[t]o be human is to be sociable."3
Through "relationship [s] of passion and permanence" with others, we
are able to recognize the reflection of ourselves .3 The formation of a
romantic relationship is built on universal characteristics-love,
commitment, support, communication and intimacy. A relationship
of love can exist between two persons with or without society's con-
sent. Relationships without the support of society have achieved, in
the public eye and through artistic interpretations, a level of notoriety.
As a practical matter, however, these often have required a great de-
gree of secrecy. Through trust and personal commitment, some
clandestine relationships have survived social ridicule.36 These clan-
destine relationships will continue to nourish the lives of their
participants in spite of the difficulties the participants face over and
above those whose relationships are accepted by society.
Marriages for reasons other than love, as described above, may
seem absurd when applied to same-gender couples. Although less
likely than with opposite-gender couples, the establishment of a same-
gender relationship might result in increased business or the merger of
two successful companies. Perhaps even more unlikely is the concept
of an arranged marriage to preserve the bloodline or to improve family
30. See Genesis 2:18-25.
31. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971); Hart, supra note 11,
at 31; Thomas, supra note 11, at 42.
32. See David Bromell, Sermon on Genesis 2:18-25, 1, 2 (1988) (copy on file with
author of this paper).
33. Bromell, supra note 32, at 3.
34. Bromell, supra note 32, at 3.
35. Bromell, supra note 32, at 3.
36. See SAME-SEX MARRUAGE, supra note 9, at 3-45 (a collection of writings about same-
sex marriage in history).
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standing. Although one of the many advantages of legal marriage may
be this opportunity to masquerade business or other relationships as
covenants of love for contractual benefits, the essence of marriage is
found in the lasting and fulfilling commitment to be in a loving rela-
tionship with another human being.
B. Marriage As Traditional
Tradition is another important aspect of marriage. The role of
marriage, as an institution in our society, has acquired greater mean-
ing through its long history as an established practice.
A story is told among United Methodist seminary students of a
young minister who went to his first assignment at a small country
church. He visited for one Sunday before becoming leader of the con-
gregation. In the middle of the service, he was surprised when all the
members turned to face the back of the sanctuary during the recitation
of the Apostles' Creed. Intrigued by this, he asked the current pastor
for the reason behind this practice. The pastor responded that he did
not know-in fact, he had never thought to inquire about that. He
felt it had meaning for the people in the congregation and was afraid
to rock the boat. The young minister thought perhaps he, too, should
at least get to know the church family before he started questioning
parts of its service. After several months, he was overcome with curi-
osity and asked the leaders in the church. No one seemed to know
why they had that practice. Finally, he found a charter member of the
church who told him, "When we built the church, we could not af-
ford hymnals or bulletins. Most of us knew quite a few hymns, but
many did not know the words of the Apostles' Creed. So, we painted
them on the back wall and turned around as a congregation, so as not
to embarrass anyone who did not know it by heart, you know. We
repainted 30 years ago, after buying hymnals. I guess it's just become
a tradition."
Some "traditions," like this church's habit, are devoid of contem-
porary meaning but followed without question. The significance of an
institution may become watered down or forgotten as its practice be-
comes ritualistic or legalistic. To prevent this, a member of a society
must know and honor its practices while holding the society ac-
countable, calling it on its wrongs. This involves challenging its
interpretations of legal and religious doctrine and tradition, bringing
it to task on current issues and new philosophies, ever remaining
(Vol. 5:353
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devoted and steadfast in all the commitments of membership. As Jus-
tice Blackmun said in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 7 "habit and
tradition are not in themselves an adequate answer to a constitutional
challenge."38
To the extent that marriage is rooted in tradition, it provides sta-
bility and consistency. To the extent that marriage remains a social
institution with vitality and meaning today, it is evolutionary.- Society
must be wary of losing the richness of the tradition of marriage by
focusing on gender composition as the defining characteristic of mar-
riage.
C. Marriage As Social
Naturally, marriage has not been conceptualized in the same way
over all of time. 9 Marriage has evolved from roots in a period well
before its modern development began in the European Middle Ages. 0
Some have traced the origin of the institution to an instinctual habit
of the "human animal" to preserve the species.4' This thinking imag-
ines first a habit, then a custom, then a legal institution. Prior to the
eighteenth century, the Latin ancestor of the word "family" referred to
a group of persons who lived together, including servants and slaves. 3
The boundaries of a family extended well beyond the marital unit and
served functions such as defense, politics, education, justice, and eco-
nomic productivity.4 Additionally, the procedures for entering into
marriage have varied. Marriage has been by capture, by purchase, by
concubinage, or by choice. 5 Some customs, such as animal sacrifice,
have been dropped from the wedding ceremony.4 6 Others, such as the
37. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
38. Bates, 433 U.S. at 371 (discussing the changes in attitude toward attorney advertis-
ing).
39. See FRANCES AND JOSEPH Gis, MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY IN THE MIDDLE AGES 4
(1987).
40. See GIES, supra note 39, at 16.
41. See Catherine M. Cullem, Note, Fundamental Interests and the Question of Same-Sex
Marriage, 15 TuLsA L.J. 141, 146 (1979) (quoting E. WmESRUmARcl, THE HISTORY
op HuMAN MARRIAGE (1921)).
42. See Cullem, supra note 41, at 147.
43. See GiEs, supra note 39, at 4.
44. See Gins, supra note 39, at 4, 7.
45. See JOHN BoswELL, SAME-SEx UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE 170-72 (1994)
[hereinafter BOSWELL, SAME-SEx UNoNs].
46. See JAMES F. WHirE, INTRODUCrION TO CHRISTiAN WORSHIP 239-42 (1980).
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exchange of rings, have come in and out of fashion.47 Still others, such
as acts of worship, have developed in more recent years.4"
In addition to the changes endured in configuration, method,
and conventionalities, marriage has faced shifts in opinion as to its
social purpose. Three major purposes of marriage have historically
been procreation, social stability, and gender complementarity." Pro-
creation is no longer an urgent need in modern society, and currently
no state requires fertility or reproductive capability in order to obtain
a marriage license.
50
Because the family is the smallest unit of government for any
form of social organization, marriage provides stabilization and em-
bodies cultural values.5 ' If heterosexuality is viewed as necessary for the
success of a democracy, then heterosexual marriage is the logical
subunit within which to promote this value in the United States.
However, if the values necessary to democratic society are commit-
ment, loyalty, and cooperation, a requirement of heterosexuality is
unfounded.
Although some authors suggest that same-gender marriage is not
something new, but has roots in ancient history,5" legal recognition in
the United States has been exclusively of opposite-gender relation-
ships.53 Arguably, one purpose of legal marriage has been to place
behavioral restrictions on those who marry. These restrictions were
intended to bring out the best in each gender and put restraints on the
worst characteristics.5
47. See WHITE, supra note 46, at 239-42.
48. See WHrlE, supra note 46, at 239-42.
49. See Laura M. Raisty, Bystander Distress and Loss of Consortium: An Examination of the
Relationship Requirements in Light of Romer v. Evans, 65 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2647,
2660 (1997) (listing "procreation, promotion of individual happiness and stability,
and promotion of societal stability" as important functions of marriage).
50. See WHn , supra note 48, at 245; Tobisman, supra note 8, at 114-15.
51. See, e.g., Heeb, supra note 14, at 350-51; Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205
(1888); Morris v. Morris, 220 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
52. See, e.g., JOHN BoswELL, CHIUsnAlNrry, SocIAL TOLERANCE AND HOMOSEXUALrT"
26 (1980) (arguing that, although homosexual marriages of the past did not look like
modern day marriages, neither did heterosexual marriages, and gay relationships were
recognized and described by contemporaries as marriages); Boswaa, SAME-SEx UN-
iONs, supra note 45 (providing a comprehensive description of same-sex unions in
pre-modern Europe); Damslet, supra note 8, at 558-60.
53. See Damslet, supra note 8, at 563-65.
54. See REGAN, supra note 3, at 28-31 (describing the basic principles of nineteenth-
century married life).
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A husband, for instance, was admonished to temper his sex-
ual drive to accommodate his wife's desires, to pay heed to
his wife's more refined sensibilities, and to accept her in-
struction on matters of moral improvement. A wife was
directed to be solicitous of her husband's needs, to be a con-
stant source of emotional succor to him, and to help him
attain a state of 'higher' moral development.5
In other words, one image of marriage is that it was created to ensure
that all opposite-gender unions would be successful. In order to
achieve this goal, the delineation of marital roles designed to superim-
pose a structure applicable to all couples necessarily relied on and
perpetuated stereotypes of the genders. 6 This view has faced ridicule,
however, as the much maligned gender roles once considered an inte-
gral part of marriage have given way to a more equitable and flexible
apportionment of the responsibilities and duties of each party.57
D. Marriage As Christian
Despite myths of religious freedom in the United States, this is a
religious, and predominantly Christian, country.5 The country was in
its earliest stage of settlement during the time following the English
reformation and the development of several new Christian denomina-
tions in England including Presbyterian, Baptist, Methodist,
Congregationalist, and Quaker sects.59 Even though the Puritan dis-
senters moved away from the ecclesiastical courts and recognized
secular forms of marriage, Christian theology influenced the way in
which marriage came to be understood as an institution in the United
55. REGNu, supra note 3, at 30-31 (describing marital roles during the Victorian era
when family law first developed).
56. See Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1443, 1532
(1992) (discussing the disadvantages of the traditional system of public ordering in
family law).
57. See REGAN, supra note 3, at 30; Singer, supra note 56, at 1517-22; WHrrE supra note
48, at 242.
58. See S.I. Strong, Christian Constitutions: Do They Protect Internationally Recognized
Human Rights and Minimize the Potential for Violence Within a Society?, 29 CASE W.
REs. J. IN 'L L. 1, 2 (1997).
59. See DocuMENTs OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 244-58 (Henry Bettenson ed., Oxford
University Press 2d ed. 1963).
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States.60 This conflating of religious ideas and the voice of government
continues today.' Understanding the Christian roots, then, is signifi-
cant to the picture of marriage ir the United States. The topic is
immense, but a brief look will suffice to emphasize the connection
between the Church and the institution of marriage. The early undi-
vided Christian Church would not perform marriages, but would
bless the marriage of a couple or offer Eucharist in honor of the cou-
ple. 2 The marriage ritual followed a traditional Roman pagan style,
but as long as the couple announced publicly they were married, no
service or document was required .0 As legal systems developed, a
written record became crucial to avoid disputes on issues such as off-
spring legitimacy and inheritance." The village priest was often the
only literate person available to witness and record the nuptials for
legal purposes.65 This began the process that led to a more involved
role for the Church in the marriage ritual.66 Starting in the twelfth
century, marriage ceremonies began to develop all over the Christian
world. 7 The Fourth Lateran Council declared marriage a sacrament in
1215.6 As the Church took over the marriage rites, it made relatively
few changes in the civic and pagan traditions. 9 During the sixteenth
century, the Protestant Reformers continued this absorption of the
60. Cf LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 202-04 (1985)
(describing anti-Christian conception of colonial marriage); WHrm, supra note 48, at
238-49.
61. See generally E. Gregory Wallace, When Government Speaks Religiously, 21 FiA. ST. U.
L. Rsv. 1183 (1994) (discussing the many religious symbols present in American
civic traditions, such as the words of the pledge of allegiance, the observance of a
"National Prayer Day," and the use of Bible verses in the decor of government
buildings, official seals, and monuments).
62. See BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS, supra note 45, at 162-65; WHrrE, supra note 48, at
239-40.
63. See BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS, supra note 45, at 167-68; WImT supra note 48, at
239.
64. See WHrr, supra note 48, at 239.
65. See WHrrE, supra note 48, at 240.
66. See WHtrr, supra note 48, at 240.
67. See BOSWELL, SAME-SEx UNIONS, supra note 45, at 178-85 (describing the various
ceremonies).
68. See BoswELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS, supra note 45, at 178.
69. See BoswELL, SAME-SEX UNIoNs, supra note 45 at 199; WHrrE, supra note 48 at 239
(listing rice as a fertility symbol and "bridesmaids dressed to confuse spirits" as exam-
ples of retained pagan traditions).
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legal and cultural rite into the liturgical tradition of the Christian
Church, even though they did not view it as sacramental."
Upon these medieval origins of an "ecclesiastical solemnization of
the marriage contract," the modern Protestant theology was built.7
The religious ceremony is based on the order of creation and is a sign
of a lifelong covenant between a man and a woman. 72 According to
Augustine, the Decree for the Armenians, and the Book of Common
Prayer, the purpose of marriage included three positive products: chil-
dren, mutual faithfulness, and God's gift of a special permanent
bond,7 3 granted by God's grace. The United Methodist theological
understanding is representative of current mainstream Protestant
thinking, acknowledging that marriage may not result in a commit-
ment to bear children and that sexual union is a gift of God to be
enjoyed in marriage, even if children do not result.74 Through their
union, the couple is both asking for and expressing daily graces
granted by God.75 The couple's life is a reflection of God's love for the
Church, and their fidelity emphasizes the possibility of Christian life
70. "The Protestant Reformers of the sixteenth century were unwilling to call marriage a
sacrament because they did not regard matrimony as a necessary means of grace for
salvation." THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, COMPANION TO THE BOOK OF SERV-
ICES 99 (1988) [hereinafter COMPANION]; see WHITE, supra note 48, at 242-43.
71. See COMPANION, supra note 70, at 97.
72. See COMPANION, supra note 70, at 98-99. The following verses are commonly con-
sidered part of the "Creation Story":
The Lord God said, "It is not good that the man should be alone; I will
make him a helper fit for him." So out of the ground the Lord God formed
every beast of the field and every bird of the air, and brought them to the
man to see what he would call them; and whatever the man called every
living creature, that was its name. The man gave names to all cattle, and to
the birds of the air, and to every beast of the field; but for the man there
was not found a helper fit for him. So the Lord God caused a deep sleep to
fall upon the man, and while he slept took one of his ribs and dosed up its
place with flesh; and the rib which the Lord God had taken from the man
he made into a woman and brought her to the man. Then the man said,
"This at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called
Woman, because she was taken out of Man." Therefore a man leaves his
father and his mother and cleaves to his wife, and they become one flesh.
And the man and his wife were both naked, and were not ashamed.
Genesis 2:18-25 (Revised Standard Version).
73. See ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CrT OF GOD 469-70 (Marcus Dods trans. 1950); WHITE,
supra note 48, at 244-45; David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage? Baehr v.
Miike and the Meaning ofMarriage, 38 S. Tax. L. Rnv. 1, 31 (1997).
74. See, e.g., COMPANION, supra note 70 at 100; WHITE, supra note 48, at 241-42.
75. See COMPANION, supra note 70 at 99.
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in the earthly world.76 The new couple makes "a little family within
the household of God, a 'little church' in the Body of Christ."77 Mar-
riage is not a private matter in this context. "Marriage is the business
of two individuals, but it is undertaken within a greater company of
witnesses, supporters, and friends. ' 78 The rest of the church commu-
nity is witness to the exchange of vows and is directed, having heard
the proclamation and been given the opportunity to object, to avoid
intrusion or interference with the couple.7" The vows, as the most an-
cient part of the service, are derived from legal language and not
religious language.8 Recent revisions of the marriage services have in-
corporated more covenant language over contract language and have
expressed modern insights into the relationship between the sexes.'
The Christian understanding of these promises and claims is that they
"are something more than, and different from, the claims of the legal
contract that marriage is in the eyes of the state."8 2 They are viewed as
transcending the law and are genuine expectations of those wedded,
enabled by God's unconditional love and mercy.83
76. See THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, THE BOOK OF SERVICES 67-68 (1988)
(Explaining in the service that the rings are the "outward and visible sign of an in-
ward and spiritual grace, signifying to us the union between Jesus Christ and his
Church."); COMPANION, supra note 70, at 99; Daniel Maguire, The Morality of Ho-
mosexual Marriage, in THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE, supra note 7, at 57, 63
(stating that married love should be constant and entered into with a willingness to
sacrifice which will lead to the holy purification of both parties).
77. COMPANION, supra note 70, at 99.
78. EDWARD S. GLEASON, REDEEMING MARRIAGE 11 (1988); see also WHITE, supra note
48, at 241-42.
79. See GI.EAsON, supra note 77, at 24-25 (explaining the history and meaning of the
bann, a formal announcement at a public service which existed in the days before a
marriage license and now is found in the service as a final opportunity for anyone
who can show just cause why the couple should not be married to speak).
80. See COMPANION, supra note 70, at 97; WHrrIE, supra note 48, at 240 (making refer-
ence to liturgical phrases such as "to have and to hold" from the legal conveyance of
property and "from this day forward" from the dating of a legal contract).
81. See COMPANION, supra note 70, at 98 ("All the major traditions and churches have
revised or newly written marriage services in recent years."); WHITE, supra note 48, at
241-42.
82. See COMPANION, supra note 70, at 101.
83. See COMPANION, supra note 70, at 101.
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II. THE LAw oF MARRIAGE
A. Marriage As Regulative
With such a prominent place in social and religious history, mar-
riage is considered favored by the law. The law brings society in as the
third party to the marriage, regulating the creation and dissolution of
the private contract. Once the medieval Christian Church formulated
a definition of the traditional model of marriage, based on the theo-
logical underpinnings discussed above, it became part of the corpus of
canon law.8" During the latter two-thirds of the nineteenth century,
"family law first emerged as a distinct body of law."85 During the
Victorian Age, "a fear that rising individualism would dissolve any
sense of self that was rooted in communal responsibility" gave birth to
the view of "family as a network of interdependent roles" that needed
reinforcement through legal status." Ecclesiastical courts, rooted in
the ancient canon law, had jurisdiction over marriage in England, and
the Church continued to play a significant role in the administration
of matrimonial law." Family law in the United States took on a de-
cidedly secular vestment, rejecting what was regarded by the Puritan
colonists as the oppressive nature of the Anglican church.8" No doubt
exists, despite this separation of marriage from the domain of the
Church, that the Judeo-Christian religious roots run deep and con-
tinue to affect legal thinking on the subject. The early secular
emphasis in United States marriage law allowed for the emergence of
two new doctrines: common-law marriage and divorce by the courts."
Common-law marriage was also an accommodation to the geographi-
cal dispersion of the population." Both were modifications of
traditional marriage law tolerated during the nascent nation's efforts
to develop its own organizational identity.
The translation of family values into legal norms is not a simple
nor precise activity. The legal system in this country established its
own definition of marriage by delineating rights and requirements,
84. See Coolidge, supra note 73, at 31.
85. REGAN, supra note 3, at 3-4.
86. REGAN, supra note 3, at 4.
87. See FIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 202.
88. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 202-03.
89. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 202-08.
90. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 203.
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while retaining much of its traditional meaning. The right to marry
has since been linked to the constitutional guarantee of the right to
privacy." Subject to this and other constitutional restraints, statutory
regulation has been delegated primarily to the individual states. 2 Stat-
utes regulate only the qualifications and mode of entering into
marriage, duties and obligations, effects on property rights and
grounds for dissolution. 3 The requirements for entering into ceremo-
nial marriage vary, but generally include solemnization, consent,
capacity, and licensing formalities. 4 Solemnization can be performed
by a religious or civil official to formally celebrate the contract. Con-
sent must be freely given and not the product of fraudulent
representation. Capacity to marry refers to a wide variety of matters
including mental or physical capacity, existing marital status, consan-
guinity, and age sufficiency. 7 Licensing requirements may include
blood tests and medical examinations. 9 The status granted in one
state is recognized in all states, even if the second state has different
statutory requirements." So, once the status is attained, it receives a
presumption of validity and permanence across state lines. This pre-
sumption is derived from the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
United States Constitution, which reads "Full Faith and Credit shall
91. See Lovingv. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (defending the freedom to marry as the
court struck down antimiscegenation laws on the grounds that they violated equal
protection); Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (protecting the use
of contraceptives as falling under an individual's right to privacy and emphasizing the
right to marry as predating the Bill of Rights).
92. See Curt Pham, Let's Get Married in Hawaii: A Story of Conflicting Laws, Same-Sex
Couples, and Marriage, 10 FXm. L Q. 727, 729 (1996).
93. See, e.g., CAL. Fm. CODE ANN. §§ 310, 700 et. seq., 752, 760 (West 1994); N.Y.
DOM. RnI. LAw §§ 50, i40, 170 (McKinney 1988); Tx. Fm. CODE ANN.
§§ 7.001, 7.002 (West 1998); UNIp. MARAGE AND DivoRcE Act §§ 201, 208,
301, 302 (1973); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 204 (1888).
94. See, e.g., CAL. Fm. CODE ANN. §§ 300, 350, 352 (West 1994); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAw §§ 7, 10, 12, 13 (McKinney 1988); Tx. FA. CODE ANN. § 1.07 (West
1998); UNIF. MARMIAGE AND DWoRcE Acr §§ 201-203, 206 (1973).
95. See, e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw §§ 11, 13 (McKinney 1988); UNIF. MARRIAGE AND
DivORcE AcT § 206 (1973).
96. See, e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 7 (McKinney 1988); UNIF. MARRGE AND Di-
voRcE AcT § 208(a)(1)(1973).
97. See In re Estate of Hendrickson, 805 P.2d 20 (1991) (finding husband mentally
competent to enter into common-law marriage). See, e.g., CAL FAM. CODE. ANN.
§ 301 (West 1994); N.Y. DOM. REL LAw § 15-a (McKinney 1988); UNI. MAR-
RIAGE AND DiVORcE AcT §§ 203, 207, 208 (1973).
98. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw §§ 13-aa (McKinney 1988); UNIF. MARRIAGE AND
DrvoRCE Acr § 203 (1973).
99. See Pham, supra note 92, at 729.
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be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Pro-
ceedings of every other State."'0 Congress has acted to undermine this
provision in the context of same-gender marriage by creating a law
that expressly permits a state to refuse to honor a same-gender union
solemnized outside its borders.' 1 This statute is now commonly re-
ferred to as the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"). A full discussion
of the constitutional implications of enacting a law that appears, by its
very language, to violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause is beyond
the scope of this Article. 2
Historically, the Puritan desire to distance matrimony from the
Anglican Church provided sufficient reason to focus on its contractual
characteristics. As family law has moved in the direction of private
contract law, °3 judicial opinion of contract law has shifted from the
acontextual, free contracting of the Lochner '" era to a more active ju-
dicial analyisis of the relational status of the parties.' 0 ' The movement
by contract law toward status has intercepted the movement of family
law toward contract (and away from status). 06 This is to say, the focus
on private contracting has not made manifest an honoring of family
contracts without judicial examination of the people involved and the
subject matter and nature of the arrangements agreed to by the par-
ties. 0 7 Instead, the review of the terms of a marital contract and
intrusive inquiry into the relationship itself actually means more in-
tensive court scrutiny.' 8 Still, in response to the "modern insistence
on personal choice in intimate matters," the courts have shown some
100. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
101. The law grants the states permission to ignore "any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other state, territory, possession, or tribe" that validates a same-
gender marriage within the borders of the other state. 28 U.S.C.A § 1738C (1996).
102. For views on either side of the constitutionality of DOMA, see Mark Strasser, Loving
the Romer Out of Baehr: On Acts in Defense of Marriage and the Constitution, 58 U.
Prrr. L. Rav. 279 (1997) [hereinafter, Strasser, Loving the Romer Out of Baehr]
(finding DOMA unconstitutional); Same-Sex Marriage: Hearing on S. 1740 Before
the Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Lynn Wardle, Pro-
fessor of Law at B.Y.U.) (supporting the passage of DOMA).
103. See RBEGAN, supra note 3, at 35-36; Singer, supra note 56 at 1444 (indicating a trend
over the last 25 years of privatization supplanting public ordering of family relations).
104. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (disallowing state law interference with
the number of working hours contracted between bakers and their employers).
105. See REGAN, supra note 3, at 90-93 (focusing on the changed views regarding em-
ployer/employee and landlord/tenant contractual relations).
106. See REGAN, supra note 3, at 36, 90, 93.
107. See REGAN, supra note 3, at 90.
108. See REGAN, supra note 3, at 90.
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willingness to look beyond formality," 9 finding status in the absence
of legal marriage" ' or allowing private contract to overcome obliga-
tions imported into the relationship by law."'
The legal presumptions attendant to the status of marriage follow
it into all areas of law, such as tax, tort, health care, immigration,
criminal, employment, and property. Benefits are granted by the pow-
ers of federal and state legislatures, the development of common law,
and private companies or organizations. For example, federal laws be-
stow tax exemptions and family or medical leave entitlement." '2 Only
legal spouses can agree to have property held with right of survivor-
ship in various states." 3 The test used by courts to determine whether
a person has standing to bring a loss of consortium action precludes a
same-gender partner from having a day in court." ' The list of ways in
which the legal status of "married" creates financial benefits extends
into the private realm where a husband and wife can save on the cost
of benefit dinners, travel accommodations, and social organizations.
All judicial decisions to tighten or loosen the application of mar-
riage benefits based on finding legal status send shock waves
throughout our legal system. To require strict compliance with statu-
tory requirements limits contractual recovery for those who are all but
109. REGAN, supra note 3, at 41.
110. See, e.g., Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994) (holding that someone other
than a spouse or blood relative could recover for emotional distress resulting from
injury to a car accident victim); Levar v. Elkins, 604 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1980)
(affirming monetary award from assets acquired during the relationship to a woman
after the dissolution of a longterm nonmarital union); Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d
106 (Cal. 1976) (holding that express contracts between nonmarital partners are en-
forceable and, beyond that, the conduct of the parties should be explored to
determine if they had an implied contract).
111. See, e.g., Dawley v. Dawley, 551 P.2d 323 (Cal. 1976) (explaining that the antenup-
tial contract in which the parties agreed that the "property acquired during the
marriage would be held as separate property" did not violate public policy); Hill v.
Hill, 356 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (finding the provision of an antenup-
tial agreement which set out the disposition of marital property in the event of
dissolution to be valid and enforceable).
112. See I.RC. § 2056(a) (providing for an unlimited marital deduction in transfer taxa-
tion); 29 U.S.C.A. § 2612 (West Supp. 1998) (granting eligible employees
entitlement to up to twelve weeks of leave without negative effects on work status for
the birth of children, for caregiving to a seriously ill spouse, son, daughter, or parent,
for own serious illness, but not for caregiving to a seriously ill same-gender life part-
ner).
113. See, e.g., Tax. PROB. CODE ANN. § 451 (West Supp. 1998) (allowing property "to
pass" outside of probate proceedings because decedent's interest ceases to exist at
death).
114. See infra notes 267-72 and accompanying text.
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legally married."' To require some lesser standard, like a good faith
effort to meet the requirements, perverts the social desire to provide
favored status to those conforming to social norms. To require sub-
stantial compliance, as most courts have done, 1 6 is to provide no clear
standard at all and to leave the case law open to convoluted rhetoric,
such as: "[t] he validity of a marriage is governed by statutes which are
to be construed in favor of validation even when the marriage was not
entered into according to statutory requirements, unless the statutes
cannot fairly be so construed."" 7
Realists can point to such opinions as evidence that the definition
of marriage is what a particular court says it is and that there is no
"fixed" definition of marriage. The legal construct of marriage changes
depending on who is sitting on the bench. Under a formalist view,
conventional conceptions are used to determine what relationships
constitute a family or a marriage."' Therefore, in the absence of
statutory definitions, terms like wife and husband mean what they
have always meant."' The problem with this circular argument is that
it relies on an assumption that words defined in relation to one an-
other all have inherent gender connotations.' 20 Husband and wife are
as much terms describing roles as they are terms corresponding to
gender.' 2' Feminists have alerted society to the danger of using these
gender-based role descriptions as methods of oppression.'22 The duties
of "wife" or "husband" as historically propagandized may be per-
formed by either gender. In a prolix refutation of the accusation that
marriage as exclusively heterosexual is merely a tautological argument,
one author came full circle to the conclusion that "the definition of
115. See Weaver v. Searle, 558 F. Supp. 720 (N.D. Ala. 1983) (disallowing action by
husband for loss of consortium because the injury to his wife occurred before they
were legally married, even though it was after they moved in together).
116. See Starrett v. Tyon, 392 N.W.2d 94 (S.D. 1986) (holding valid a marriage solem-
nized beyond the time limit after the issuance of a license).
117. Starrett, 392 N.W.2d at 95.
118. See Raisty, supra note 49, at 2659.
119. See Roe v. Ludtke Trucking, 732 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (stating
that since the term "wife" was not defined as used in the statute, "it should be given
its plain and ordinary meaning. .. ).
120. See Mohr, supra note 10, at 219-23 (arguing that dictionary definitions "define mar-
riage in terms of spouses, spouses in terms of husband and wife, and husband and
wife in terms of marriage" and legal definitions do not clarify these meanings, but
rather use them to support gender discrimination).
121. See Rroi, supra note 3, at 116 (indicating a new commitment on the part of society
to refrain from assigning family roles based solely on gender).
122. See Singer, supra note 56, at 1532.
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marriage as a cross-gender union is not merely a matter of arbitrary
definition or semantic word-play; it is fundamental to the concept and
nature of marriage itself."'3 The author adds, "[a] same-sex relation-
ship is something else," even if it resembles marriage in other ways
besides the union of persons of opposite gender. 2 4 Both extremes of
this argument are weak. The traditional approach to the definition
denies the fluid quality of marriage. Relationships are not static. Ar-
guments on the other side simply deny that certain words ever had a
definite meaning and advocate free reclaiming and redefining of gen-
der in marriage. The response of Congress to this debate is to enter
waters not generally considered within federal purview' 5 and to create
a statutory definition that allows only opposite genders to marry one
another for the purpose of qualifying for federal benefits.'2
This esoteric manipulation of the definition is accompanied by
other, equally nimble, academic gymnastics on the topic of legaliza-
tion of same-gender marriage. Whether the argument is that same-
gender persons may not marry because of an absence in the law of
such a provision or that the law by definition prohibits same-gender
unions, the effects are the same. One argument advanced by propo-
nents of same-gender marriage is that the erosion by courts of the
importance of the other requirements for marriage opens the door to
further ignore any provisions that expressly or implicitly limit mar-
riage to opposite-gender persons. Neither the deconstructionist, who
seems to want to throw the baby out with the bath water, nor the
formalist, who believes words somehow capture reality, stand on solid
ground.
A legal system has the power to grant privileges without regard
for the rights of those unable to attain the preferential status. This is
justified by society's need to set standards for its survival. In deter-
mining standards for marriage, society must decide what its
preferences are as to what values must be embodied in the family rela-
tionship. Society should not blindly implement traditional views and
rely on empty platitudes like "family values" as if they embody univer-
sal themes. Where the legislature must be most conscientious is in
123. Wardle, supra note 14, at 39.
124. Wardle, supra note 14, at 39.
125. See e.g., Pham, supra note 92 at 728-30 (using the example of Hawaii to introduce
choice of laws concerns in addressing same-sex marriage).
126. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1997) (defining "marriage" as the "legal union between one man
and one woman" for the interpretation of Congressional acts and administrative
rulings).
[Vol. 5:353
THE MARRIAGE MIRAGE
keeping up with the opinions of society so that the definition reflects
the most favored set of values and grants benefits to all who can
manifest those ideals.
When Loving v. Virginia was decided in 1967, society may not
have been ready for the expanded access to marriage by interracial
couples. In that case, the Court denounced antimiscegenation statutes
as unconstitutional.'27 The temptation to compare the court's over-
turning of state laws that made interracial marriage illegal with the
current opportunity facing the court system to legalize same-gender
marriage is great. However, in Loving, the Court was working with
clear legal precedent that characterized race as a suspect class.'28 Here,
the courts have a difficult time determining whether the proper classi-
fications for the equal protection arguments are based on gender or
sexual orientation.2 9 Gender would implicate the stronger test for the
state, and, yet, it is only one of intermediate scrutiny, less than that
required for classification by race. The state may not be able to meet
its burden in the case of same-gender marriage regardless of classifica-
tion. Still, the legal precedent coupled with the compelling interest
test made the Loving case an "easier" one. No doubt I look on that
decision with thirty years of social adjustment to its ramifications. The
law did act first and social opinion has changed. The newer approach
to the issue, as demonstrated in Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics,130
which analyzes the problem as a violation of the right to choose one's
own life partner, makes same-gender marriage an easier legal moun-
tain to climb.31 However, more than one court will have to accept
that phrasing of the issue of right to privacy before legalization of
same-gender marriage necessarily follows.
When a privilege is universal to the needs of the individuals of
the society, it becomes fundamental. When the connection between
the privilege and what it is said to promote is so attenuated as to be
nonexistent, it must be revised by law. In addition, the lawmakers
must make sure that the laws actually promote these values. Laws that
serve to shape attitudes about marriage and foster its image as an
127. See Loving, 388 U.S. at2.
128. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
129. Compare, e.g. Dean v. Dist. of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1993), with Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
130. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska
Super. 1998).
131. See infra notes 221-30 and accompanying text.
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enduring and stable relationship need to reflect current social values.'
Accordingly, Elizabeth Scott suggests that the law "impose a
mandatory delay before moving for divorce" or "disfavor the moving
party in the divorce settlement" or impose higher costs for divorcing
couples with minor children by requiring counseling and evaluation of
the children before allowing the divorce. 133 The social view of what is
valued in a family must be capable of including the family headed by
a same-gender couple before the law changes to allow same-gender
marriage.
Our legal system has deemphasized reciprocal duties and obliga-
tions between spouses by focusing on private rights in personal life.'
3 1
Accountability shrinks even as we increase the bundle of rights offered
to those who enter into the legal union.' 35 This lessening of obligation
suits a strongly individualist society, but does not increase the strength
and stability of our country. Society's sense of entitlement is reflected
in modern rights arguments that downplay the necessity of concom-
mitant responsibility. Some same-gender couples also may be
susceptible to this desire for benefits over a willingness to be account-
able to one another and to society by providing a stable family in
exchange for marital status. Certainly, in my estimation, opposite-
gender couples have proven susceptible, leading to instability in the
institution of marriage.
Because of the long history of marriage and its relational, tradi-
tional, social, religious, and legal aspects, same-gender marriage
cannot be thrust into our legal system solely based on the rights argu-
ment or contractual similarities or definitional ambiguities. The
United States is a collectivist society of individuals. The law and social
opinion are dependent on one another, and neither should lead fur-
ther than the other is willing to go. That is not to say same-gender
marriage is inappropriate for the United States. Rather, the granting
of legal rights should move slowly on such a pervasive and emotive
issue, in order to facilitate and accommodate change in social opinion.
132. See REaN, supra note 3, at 175.
133. Elizabeth Scott, Rational Decisionmaking about Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. Rav.
9, 58 (1990).
134. See REGAN, supra note 3, at 39.
135. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text; infia note 316 and accompanying
text.
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B. Marriage As Constitutive
The above discussion of the varied, but interrelated, sources of
the meaning of marriage emphasizes that family law is not self-
contained, nor should it be. Among the various attempts to under-
stand and explain the descriptive and normative aspects of law are the
dual theories of law as regulative and law as constitutive. 136 The regu-
lative perspective views law as reflective of social morality, but separate
from it. 137 By providing incentives and deterrents, rules proclaim val-
ues and effectuate conformity. Thus, regulative theory holds that law
molds behavior within society through a set of precise rules that gov-
ern daily activity and interaction.
In contrast, the theory that law is constitutive focuses on how law
determines identity within society. Marital relationships are among the
many legally recognized "social relationships that are fundamental to
our identity."'3' Family law, then, provides the language for under-
standing oneself through one's roles.
139
Constitutive legal concepts do affect ordinary language and influ-
ence the manner in which those who are married and those who are
not married perceive reality.140 Ruth Margaret Buchanan explains,
"[w]e cannot escape the myriad ways in which legal norms and insti-
tutions have figured in our discourse and our practices, even and
especially when we are trying to transform that discourse and those
practices." 14' The "socially constructed interpretation of law" provides
a symbolic paradigm for comprehending social relations.' The law
becomes transformative when, relying on the legal system's facade of
"objectivity, universality, and neutrality," society institutionalizes
"emerging social conventions" through legal reformation.14 ' This
136. For a full discussion, see REcAN, supra note 3, at 176-83 (arguing that family law
fails to impact regulative law, but helps shape a culture within a constitutive under-
standing).
137. See REGAN, supra, note 3, at 177.
138. Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MIcH. L.
REv. 685,733 (1992).
139. See REGAN, supra, note 3, at 181.
140. See MARYAN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WEsTERN LAW 9 (1987).
141. Ruth Margaret Buchanan, Context, Continuity, and Difference in Poverty Law Schol-
arshzp, 48 U. Mmi~ L. REv. 999, 1002 (1994) (discussing law as constitutive in the
context of different approaches to poverty lawyering).
142. Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New Institution-
alism and the Law andSocial Tradition, 1 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 903, 937 (1996).
143. Suchman & Edelman, supra note 142, at 937.
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transformative quality is the aspect of law's dialogue with society that
is downplayed in the regulative and constitutive models, but is rele-
vant to the debate of same-gender marriage. Within this framework,
the stakes involved in the legalization of same-gender marriage be-
come ever clearer.
Changing the law to allow for same-gender marriages invokes the
transformative power of the law. The laws of the United States are not
authoritarian. Society may use law, religion, and other stalwart estab-
lishments to exert pressure (or oppression) that encourages
conformity, but it cannot demand compliance, at least not within a
system founded on individual freedom and diversity. Even its most
forceful form of retribution for what society deems to be wrong,
criminal punishment, does not guarantee reformed behavior by all of
its members, as evidenced by the ongoing need for law enforcement.
Without legal same-gender marriage, gays and lesbians will continue
to live in covenantal unions, creating a strong, but unrecognized, piece
of the substructure of this country. If society's negative reinforcers
such as ostracism, prejudice, discrimination, or criminal punishment
cannot prevent this, the deprivation of legal marriage, which is simply
no reinforcement at all, cannot keep persons from living out their af-
finities in familial units.
Unlike opposite-gender cohabitors, those married at common
law, and barren heterosexual couples, gays and lesbians are unable to
achieve symbolic conformity with the law because their nonconform-
ity as couples is apparent. Ironically, same-gender couples can access
the right to the public institution of marriage in spite of this noncon-
formity, only if the legal system honors their right to privacy. For this
reason, the "private" right of same-gender marriage may offend the
majority, because, if exercised, these private relationships would be
more visible. Interpreters of the law are less open to applying substan-
tial compliance standards to those who ask for transformation of
symbols. If this were an issue like changing the minimum age for mar-
riage, then the legislature would be more likely to experiment because
it would not disturb the transcendental meaning of marriage, nor
would it be an indefinite commitment. Minimum age is set arbitrarily
along a continuum of social prudence, but is not entrenched with the
same symbolic meaning as are gender qualifications. All arguments
that same-gender couples are entitled to the same loosening of regula-
tive standards as others who have benefited from exceptions to the
statutory and common law requirements are not admitting the fun-
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damental difference. Without discussing the immutability of homo-
sexuality, once a same-gender couple is married, homosexuality is an
immutable aspect of their relationship. The status granted by marriage
is permanent.
III. IMPACT OF CURRENT LAW ON IDENTITY OF HOMOSEXUALS
A. Gay and Lesbian Views of Their Relationships
"7 have also been called one thing and then another while no
one really wished to hear what I called myself" ",4
This section will discuss some of the ways in which gay couples
may be affected by the unavailability of legal marriage and efforts to
legally compensate for this. By no means is this section intended to
attribute all of these effects to all couples. Essentialism is dangerous
whether in reference to homosexual couples, women, or any group
with one or more identifying traits. However, in order to theorize, I
rely on generalization.
Gender differences, though highly stereotyped, carry some validity
and may be more apparent when amplified in gay couples.'45 For exam-
ple, according to lesbian folklore, women are likely to move in with one
another after just a few dates." 6 This stereotype has become a shorthand
for observable behavior. It can be embraced as positive and humorous
by lesbians or used to belittle and patronize lesbians by society at
large. The behavior pattern that gives rise to the stereotype is a coping
skill developed in response to the hostility of society. Opposite-gender
couples can celebrate their love in the open air without the danger of
negative repercussions due to social attitudes regarding their affec-
tional orientation. Lesbians who wish to avoid the possible conflict
with family, friends, co-workers and neighbors, must cocoon to nur-
ture their relationships.147 When one internalizes the perceptions of
others, those perceptions and the coping skills developed to deal with
them become a part of that person's identity.
144. RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 433 (30th anniversary ed., 1981).
145. See Patricia A. Cain, Lesbian Perspective, Lesbian Experience, and the Risk of Essential-
ism, 2 VA. J. Soc. Por'Y & L. 43, 62 (1994).
146. See LINDSEY VAN GELDNER & PAMELA ROBIN BRANDT, THE GIRLS Nrcr DooR 160
(1996).
147. See generally Cain, supra note 145, at 63-69.
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Also, in the absence of socially recognized same-gender marriages,
most gay men and lesbians were raised with the heterosexual relation-
ship as the predominant role model for the intimate partnership.' As
couples discover that same-gender affectional preference and role
complementarity as learned throughout childhood does not always pro-
vide easy answers for setting up an intimate relationship, they are
forced to explore their own identity as a couple and redefine family
roles for their relationship.' The division of duties in some gay rela-
tionships is based on who is better at different tasks, who enjoys doing
certain things, and how they can balance time and responsibilities
between ,the two parties.5  Through the negotiation and compromise
of finding what role delineations will work for them, a couple carves
out its own identity.
Whatever the actual duties assumed by a heterosexual couple, the
law provides terms for their association. "Husband," "wife," and
"spouse" are more than descriptions of roles, they are words of status.
Without the legal recognition, gays and lesbians have the shared expe-
rience of grappling for an equivalent name for the other in their
intimate relationships. Terms like "life partner," "lover," "friend," and
"roommate" have been used to describe the one loved. When
"significant other" began in common use, it was quickly taken on to
be affectional-preference-neutral, and now applies to any person with
whom one is intimate, even a legal spouse. The process of naming
one's self and those in one's life is transformational 5' and can dimin-
ish the negative effects of being nameless by focusing on positive
characteristics of those who share that name. 1 2 Words are powerful
because of this force. Yet, lesbians and gay men are still without a
common term for their relationships or terms for each other. By de-
nying recognition of same-gender marriage, the law has allowed any
148. See Douglas Carl, Counseling Same-Sex Couples, in THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE,
supra note 7, at 44, 48 (commenting that same-gender couples may have to negotiate
roles and, therefore, can be more creative).
149. See Carl, supra note 148, at 48; Mohr, supra note 10, at 235-36 (supporting the
statement that "[a]ll long-term gay male relationships ... devise their own special
ways of making the relations satisfying" by quoting DAVID P. MCWHIRTER & AN-
DREW M. MATrISON, THE MALE CouPLE: How RELATiONSHirs DEVELOP (1984), on
the development by gay men of styles of relationship "without the aid of visible role
models available to heterosexual couples").
150. See Mohr, supra note 10, at 229.
151. See Barbara J. Cox, A (Personal) Essay on Same-Sex Marriage, in THE MORAL AND
LEGAL DEBATE, supra note 7, at 27, 29.
152. See Cain, supra note 145, at 57-59.
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language adopted by the homosexual community to be inferior to
words used by opposite-gender couples. Society, as a whole, has failed
to honor or to give any weight to words used by the gay community
for their loved ones.
Same-gender couples also share the experience of discovering per-
sonal affections in a world that is hostile to them. Sexual awareness
generally coincides with adolescence, perhaps the most vulnerable and
stressful time in life. To realize at that time "that one is a 'queer,' a
'faggot,' and a 'pervert' is terrifying news to the delicate emergent
ego.""' The retelling of this survival story becomes part of the ritual-
istic sharing among homosexual affiliates, because they must continue
to affirm their own and each other's identity.'54 The denial and shame
that results from social pressure to remain silent, to be invisible, is
something gay men and lesbians must address as they form intimate
associations.'W They must discuss during the initial dating phase how
open they want to be as a couple. 5 6 If they avoid that topic, couples
may find themselves facing a dilemma during the holiday season or
other occasion when they must decide whether to take their significant
other to office parties, family social events, or funerals.'57 Families of
origin do not always honor gay couples or recognize the attendant re-
sponsibilities and commitments. Homosexual siblings who are in
committed relationships may be the first expected to return home to
care for an ill parent or to handle the deceased parent's estate,, because
they are perceived as being more available than their married hetero-
sexual counterparts who must tend to their own families. 5 ' The
absence of status creates invisibility and causes devaluation of the un-
recognized bond. Some gay men and lesbians are abandoned by their
families of origin, others reject those who raised them, and many
adopt a new use for the word "family." The gay community, friends,
153. Maguire, supra note 76, at 65 (suggesting that gay men and lesbians have passed more
tests of psychological adjustment than most heterosexuals are ever required to face).
154. See Cain, supra note 145, at 65-67 (discussing how lesbians use the lesbian commu-
nity to develop identities by telling "coming out" stories and claiming the shared
experience of being gay).
155. See Cain, supra note 145, at 69 (asserting that, at the moment when a lesbian under-
stands her attractions, she also understands that "she had better not say a word about
[them]," and some never feel able to speak).
156. See Ta'Shia Asanti, Lesbian Couples: Defining Family for Ourselves, THE LFSBIAN
Naws, Dec. 1996, at 35.
157. See Asanti, supra note 156, at 35.
158. See Carl, supra note 148, at 48.
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and lovers become their new family.'15 "We gay folk tend to organize
our lives more like extended families than nuclear ones. We may love
our mates one at a time, but our 'primary families' are often our ex-
lovers and our ex-lovers' ex-lovers."'' These families develop their
own rites of passage for the moment of transition from single to
committed relationship to replace the legal rite of marriage.61
Although these are patterns in same-gender relationships that
effect and reflect the couple's identity, they are neither absolute nor
exclusive. Avoiding essentialism is nearly impossible when exploring
effects of public actions on a minority. The public actions, themselves,
as avenues to self-understanding are often dismissed without being
exposed as the messengers of prejudice. The loudest broadcasts of
public thought with both immediate and long-lasting ramifications
are court opinions.
B. Case Law View ofHomosexual Relationships
Messages that inform identity are encoded (often in less than
subtle language) in every case decision. Patterns that run through case
law emphasize and re-emphasize aspects of judicial and, presumably,
public views on the legal topic at issue. The body of cases on same-
gender couples and gay and lesbian family law is definitely growing,
and at a faster rate than in the past. However, the more gay men and
lesbians shout across the chasm between legal rights and responsibili-
ties afforded the sexual orientations, the louder the echo returns that
there is no legal recognition of gay and lesbian families. Some believe
the growing number of opinions is sufficient to identify a body of
"family law" which -addresses the distinct problems of same-gender
couples and related parent-child relationships. 2 As discussed below,
the opinions within this growing body of law may provide some expo-
sure, but are still unwilling to appreciate these associations as fully
within the meaning of family.
159. SeeAsanti, supra note 156, at 35.
160. Browning, supra note 9, at 133.
161. Cf Asanti, supra note 156, at 35; Cain, supra note 145, at 72-73 (supporting lesbian
marriage as a validation of lesbian relationships while accepting some theorists' view
that marriage, rooted in patriarchy, is undesirable).
162. See Craig W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family Values: The Case of Gay and Les-
bian Families, 18 CAwozo L. Ray. 1299, 1414 (1997).
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C. Case Law on Same-Gender Marriage
The entire body of case law on direct challenges to the denial of
marriage licenses to same-gender couples spans more than twenty-six
years, but includes only six appellate cases. 63 At least four others have
been initiated since 1993, but have not yet proceeded further than
lower state courts.
The first appellate decision in this series, Baker v. Nelson, 65 con-
cerned the application for a marriage license by two men in
Minnesota. The court relied on the common usage of the word
"marriage" as referring only to the relationship between a man and a
woman to counter the petitioners' contention that "the absence of an
express statutory prohibition against [same-gender] marriages" indi-
cated a contrary legislative intent.6 6 The court then addressed the
claim that such a restriction violated petitioners' rights. 67 Justice Pe-
terson's answer was simply that the court was not "independently
persuaded" by the constitutional arguments and found no support in
163. Several cases are frequently associated with these six because they also address the
opposite-gender requirement read into the marriage statute, but involve gender iden-
tity misrepresentation or transgender issues. Although these cases add to the legal
cacophony condemning same-gender marriages, they are excluded from this discus-
sion because of the absence of the fundamental issue of relationships between persons
of same-gender affectional preference. The courts, other authors, and society as a
whole tend to confuse these issues. See, e.g., In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, 513
N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987), no appealfiled; M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499
(Sup. Ct. 1971). The six appellate cases that do address the legal right of same-gender
couples to marry are: Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), cert. dis-
missed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Singer
v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1008
(1974); Dean v. Dist. of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Baehr v. Miike, No.
Civ. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996); Storrs v. Holcomb,
666 N.Y.S.2d. 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
164. See Coolidge, supra note 73, at 9. Additionally, three couples in Vermont filed a
"freedom-to-marry" lawsuit on July 22, 1997, which was heard by the Vermont Su-
preme Court in November 1998. See Hawaii, Alaska Election Results Don't Stop
Freedom to Many Movement, Nnws RELEASE (Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund, New York, NY) Nov. 4, 1998 <http://www.lambdalegal.orglcgi-
bin/pages/documents/record?record=302> [hereinafter, Election Results]; E.J. Graff,
Love and Dockets, OUT, Dec.-Jan. 1998, at 96, 98.
165. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), cert. dismissed, 409 U.S. 810
(1972).
166. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 185-86.
167. See Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186.
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any decisions of the United States Supreme Court.' 68 The opinion was
rounded out by distinguishing this case from the major cases com-
monly considered as granting preferred status to the right to marry."'
The court explained Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson'7" as high-
lighting the procreation aspect of marriage.' 7 ' Griswold v.
Connecticut was said to limit the state power to interfere with the
right of privacy implicit within a state grant of the authorization of
marriage;' 73 and Loving v. Virginia'74 was said to preclude antimiscege-
nation statutes solely because they are racially discriminatory, not
because the court redefined marriage to include couples of different
races.' This brief opinion would serve as the basis for the future re-
jections of challenges to such statutes in other states.
Further south, a couple of years later, two women challenged the
denial of a marriage license. The Kentucky Court of Appeals, then the
state's highest court, in Jones v. Hallahan,'76 relied on several diction-
ary authorities to define marriage and pointed out that marriage has
always been between a man and a woman."r The two women were to
blame, not the state, because they were incapable of meeting this defi-
nition, the court said.17 1 What they proposed simply was not marriage,
the judge ruled, and so no constitutional rights were implicated.'
Acknowledging that Kentucky statutes did not specifically prohibit
such a marriage, but simply left out any reference to it, the court
opined that the legislature was relying on the centuries-old definition
of marriage as between one woman and one man."80 In essence, the
court believed there was no mention because such a situation was un-
fathomable to the enactors. Because of the court's denial of the role of
the judicial branch in the development of the definition of marriage
and of any power to change it, this opinion presented a thinly dis-
168. See Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186.
169. See Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186-87.
170. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex relWilliamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
171. See Baker, 191 N.W.2d. at 186.
172. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
173. See Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186.
174. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
175. See Baker, 191 N.W.2d. at 187.
176. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
177. See Jones, 501 S.W.2d 588 at 589.
178. See Jones, 501 S.W.2d 588 at 589.
179. See Jones, 501 S.W.2d 588 at 590.
180. See Jones, 501 S.W.2d 588 at 589.
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guised circular argument: marriage is what we say and have always said
marriage is because that is what we say and have always said.
In this same grouping of early challenges was Singer v. Hara."'
Within a year of the Kentucky case, a Washington appellate court
faced two men who wanted to marry each other and who asserted
many of the same challenges to the law, as well as two new arguments.
This court could look to the nonbinding authority of the previous
cases to help with the challenges to the definition of marriage and the
arguments based on the federal constitution. In its very casual asser-
tion that no outside authority was needed to define marriage in its
ordinary sense, as required by the rules of statutory construction, this
court turned what had been the focus of previous opinions into a
matter of judicial notice. The court confidently asserted, "[w]e need
not resort to the quotation of dictionary definitions to establish that
'marriage' in the usual and ordinary sense refers to the legal union of
one man and one woman."' The opinion was also certain that the
state's purpose in prohibiting gay marriages was to support procrea-
tion, despite its acknowledgment that "married couples are not
required to become parents."" 3 The federal constitutional claims were
summarily dismissed as well, by using previous cases and similar
logic.,8"
The two new assertions gave the court more trouble. One of these
claims was mentioned and dropped without legitimate response and
the second was the focus of the court's writing. The two men first ar-
gued that the legislature had not "defined the competency of
marriage[,] but only the competency of the individuals seeking to
marry" one another."5 They argued that they were entitled to marry
each other because they met the competency requirements individu-
ally.16 Chief Judge Swanson, the opinion's author, adopted the state's
response which accused the appellants of putting too much weight on
the more inclusive current statutory language, which had been
changed solely for the purpose of eliminating differential age require-
ments for males and females.'" The second new attack focused on
181. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 84 Wash. 2d
1008 (1974).
182. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1191 n.6.
183. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1195.
184. See Singer, 522 P.2d at 1190-97.
185. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1189.
186. See Singer, 522 P.2d at 1191 n.6.
187. See Singer, 522 P.2d at 1191 n.6.
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Washington's newly enacted equal rights amendment to the state con-
stitution. After a laborious process, the court came full circle,
effectively adopting the state's argument again on this point, which
asserted that all same-gender marriages are deemed illegal by the state
and, therefore, no equal rights violation has occurred where both fe-
male and male pairs are equally denied marriage licenses.' 8 This'
argument runs against the conclusion in Loving v. Virginia, which in-
dicated that the fact that antimiscegenation statutes affected all races
equally did not remove from them the taint of racial discrimination. 89
Again, a court had to resort to contradictory and circular arguments.
The court's reasoning says that "the reason Singer and Barwick are
being denied equal protection of the laws is not because of their sex,
but because of their sex; second, it says that the reason same-sex cou-
ples cannot marry is because same-sex couples cannot marry.,,9
After a judicial silence of nearly twenty years, a court in the na-
tion's capital spoke on this topic in Dean v. District of Columbia.'9'
This opinion was issued per curiam, with one of the three judges dis-
senting from the court's dismissal of the petitioners' equal protection
claim. Judge Ferren, who wrote the opinion, differed from the judg-
ment of the others in that he would have required the trial court "to
determine whether same-sex couples comprise a 'suspect' or 'quasi-
suspect' class entitled either to 'strict' or 'intermediate' scrutiny," and,
if found, then he would require the District to show a compelling or,
at least, substantial interest. 192
The court was unanimous on the state's right to refuse to issue
the couple a marriage license even though the statute was gender-
neutral and did not expressly prohibit same-gender marriages.' Leg-
islative history showed no intention to include same-gender unions,
the judge reasoned.'94 The claim that the refusal to issue a marriage
license violated the District's human rights act was dismissed because
the court did not believe the enacting body intended to change the
meaning of marriage by prohibiting discrimination against persons on
the basis of gender or sexual orientation.' The majority also denied
188. See Singer, 522 P.2d at 1191 n.6.
189. See Loving v. Virginia, 383 U.S. 1, 9-11.
190. Danslet, supra note 8, at 574.
191. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995).
192. Dean, 653 A.2d. at 309.
193. See Dean, 653 A.2d. at 310-18.
194. See Dean, 653 A2d. at 310-12.
195. See Dean, 653 A.2d. at 318-20.
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any violation of the constitutional right to marry because same-gender
marriage is not a fundamental right supported by the nation's history
and tradition.'96
Judge Ferren spent the bulk of his long dissent on the point of
contention between him and the rest of the court, namely, whether
gay men and lesbians constituted a suspect or quasi-suspect class.
97
Despite his substantial knowledge and discussion of scientific and le-
gal matters and his suggestion that homosexuality may be a quasi-
suspect class, he expressly stopped short of making that determination
"without benefit of a trial record with the right kind of expert testi-
mony, subject to cross-examination." ' 98 On the other hand, the
concurring opinion written by Judge Steadman expressed a failure to
see any "unconstitutional transgression of equal protection," even if
homosexuality was a quasi-suspect class.'99 He opined that the state
may give separate recognition to the institution of opposite-gender
marriage because it is bound up with procreative sexual relations. 2
In an opinion that lacked the literary eloquence of those written
by the aforementioned judges, Judge Chang of a lower Hawaii court
provided continuing hope for proponents of same-gender marriage in
Baehr v. Miike.2"' He found that the sex-based classification of the
state marriage statute, on its face and as applied, violated the equal
protection clause of the state constitution.0 2 This case has been up the
court system once and is again on appeal with implementation sus-
pended until the Hawaii Supreme Court reviews it. The case began in
1990, when three same-gender couples sought marriage licenses from
the state health department and sued the state collectively upon their
denials." 3 The trial judge dismissed the case, but was reversed by the
Hawaii Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, which held that the
state must prove that the law was justified by a compelling state inter-
est.20 The motion for reconsideration was denied, but the decision
was clarified.20' A flurry of political activity in Hawaii resulted from
196. See Dean, 653 A.2d. at 331-32.
197. See Dean, 653 A.2d. at 333-60.
198. Dean, 653 A.2d. at 356.
199. Dean, 653 A.2d. at 363.
200. See Dean, 653 A.2d. at 363-64.
201. Baehr v. Miike, No. Civ. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
202. See Baehr, 1996 WL 694235, at *22.
203. See Baehr, 1996 WL 694235, at *1.
204. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993).
205. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 74-75.
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this decision, including the recommendation by a committee ap-
pointed by the legislature, the Commission on Sexual Orientation and
the Law, that same-gender marriage be legalized.2 The political battle
continues along the continuum that supports legalized same-gender
marriage on one end and a constitutional amendment that would de-
fine marriage as between one man and one woman on the other.2 ' In
a controversial vote, the convening of a constitutional convention was
denied,2 8 but voters did approve an amendment granting the legisla-
ture the power to enact laws that would reserve marriage to opposite-
gender couples.2°
The plurality opinion of the Hawaii Supreme Court2"' analyzed
the state constitutional issues presented by the plaintiff couples in
much the same way as Judge Ferren did the federal constitutional
claims in Dean v. District of Columbia ' except in one significant area
of the analysis, namely, the characterization of the class against whom
the statute operates. Judge Levinson, for the Hawaii Supreme Court,
indicated that the right to privacy argument is not applicable in this
case because same-gender marriage is not rooted in tradition nor is it
basic to liberty and justice. The court opted against deciding the
equal protection claims on the basis of sexual orientation, but an-
nounced that the law is an example of gender discrimination, which is
protected against under the Hawaii Constitution.2 ' Drawing a parallel
between the statute and antimiscegenation statutes, the court over-
ruled the dismissal and remanded the case to allow the state to make
its compelling interest arguments. 2" As noted above, the state failed to
convince Judge Chang that its interests in preventing same-gender
marriage were compelling. Now the Hawaii Supreme Court must re-
view those findings.
206. See Coolidge, supra note 73, at 11-12.
207. See Coolidge, supra note 73, at 12-15.
208. See Coolidge, supra note 73, at 16-17 (the vote appeared to narrowly approve the
convention, but a vast number of spoiled or blank ballots, which the Hawaii Supreme
Court ruled must be counted as "no" votes, tipped the balance to invalidate the "yes"
vote).
209. See Coolidge, supra note 73, at 17; Election Results, supra note 164 (releasing results
from Alaska and Hawaii where voters approved anti-gay measures).
210. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44.
211. See supra notes 191-98 and accompanying text.
212. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55-57.
213. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 64, 67.
214. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68.
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More recently a New York lower court issued an opinion in Storrs
v. Holcomb."5 After acknowledging the determination by the Hawaii
Supreme Court that refusal of same-gender marriage must be sup-
ported by compelling state interest, Justice Walter Relihan, Jr.
explained that an appellate division of New York courts concluded
that "only a rational relation need be shown between a similar classifi-
cation and a legitimate state purpose."2 6 Conceding that the point of
contention in that case was whether "surviving spouse" extended to
the survivor of a same-gender life partner, the court held itself bound
by that decision, which it presumed to have included a holding that
marriage is limited to opposite-gender couples."' In very polite lan-
guage, the court acknowledged that the argument which states that the
government cannot legitimately disallow the exchange of personal
vows of commitment between persons of the same gender was "not
without merit."211 Still, the judge found it too great a leap from there
"to the conclusion that a denial of a marriage license to a same-sex
couple" violates any constitutional right.29 On appeal, Justice Spain
determined that the lower court should not have reached the merits of
the case and dismissed the action for failure to join the State Depart-
ment of Health, a necessary party."
A very recent lower court decision breaks fully from case law tra-
dition in the basis of its legal arguments, analysis of legal precedent,
and overall tone. This incredibly refreshing opinion was issued by a
trial court in response to the state's motion for summary judgment in
our nation's other noncontiguous state. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Sta-
tistics,21 breaks from tradition by ruling that the state regulation
prohibiting marriages between persons of the same gender violates
federal and state right to privacy.22 Unprecedented in the blatant
challenge of the social assumptions perpetuated by the above opin-
ions, Judge Michalski says, "It is not enough to say that 'marriage is
marriage' and accept without any scrutiny the law before the court. It
215. Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Sup. Ct. 1996).
216. Storrs, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 287 (citing In re Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div.
1993)).
217. See Storrs, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 287 (emphasis added).
218. Storrs, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
219. Storrs, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
220. See Storrs v. Holcomb, 666 N.Y.S.2d 835, 837 (App. Div. 1997).
221. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3 AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska
Super. Feb. 27, 1998).
222. SeeId. at*1, 4.
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is the duty of the court to do more than merely assume that marriage
is only, and must only be, what most are familiar with."M The court
portrays the state role in the facilitation and recognition of marriage as
merely ministerial.224 Judge Michalski points out that, in spite of
seeking public recognition, plaintiffs, Jay Brause and Gene Dugan, are
asserting their state constitutional right to privacy. 25 Case law in
Alaska has protected "very public conduct" under the right to privacy,
a right to be free of governmental intrusion into one's intimate af-
fairs.226  "Clearly, the right to choose one's life partner is
quintessentially the kind of decision which our culture recognizes as
personal and important. Though the choice of a partner is not left to
the individual in some cultures, in ours it is no one else's to make."227
The court rephrases the question from "whether same-sex marriage is
so rooted in our traditions that it is a fundamental right" to "whether
the freedom to choose one's own life partner is so rooted in our tradi-
tions" as to be fundamental. Judge Michalski explains that asking
the wrong question has led courts to reach a contrary conclusion.229
The opinion concludes by finding that the obvious gender-based clas-
sification of the statute would subject it to intermediate scrutiny, if it
were not subject to the compelling interests test required by the viola-
tion of the fundamental right to privacy.230 The judge repeatedly refers
to Mr. Brause and Mr. Dugan by name. Even in the absence of any
binding authority, the opinion is positive evidence of changing judi-
cial views and is a creative approach to the legal problem. It will cause
some to reframe their thinking and generally will influence social
opinion.
One author's summarization of the arguments by the petitioners
in the appellate cases looks like this: 1) "same-sex relationships are
equivalent to male-female" relationships because they also "involve a
mix of intimacy and commitment and neither are required to be pro-
creative;" 2) therefore, "where a marriage statute does require male-
female couples, it should be struck down as unconstitutional" because
it violates the right to liberty, privacy, marriage, and equality, and the
223. Brause, 1998 WL 88743, *2.
224. See Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at*2
225. See Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *3.
226. See Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *3
227. Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *4.
228. Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *4
229. See Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *4
230. See Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *6.
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state has insufficient interests to allow violation of these individual
rightsa s The courts, however, were not sympathetic to these argu-
ments and the response mirrored the assertions by saying: 1) "same-
sex relationships are not the equivalent of marriage" because same-
gender couples are inherently unable to meet the definition of mar-
riage, which historically has only included male-female couples
because those are procreative relationships; 2) where a marriage statute
is silent, it is intended to limit marriage to male-female couples; 3)
where a marriage statute is defined as limited to opposite-gender cou-
ples, it is constitutional because it does not violate any constitutional
rights.
2
The positions of the complainants and reasoning of the courts are
diametrically opposed. The difference relates to identifying the major
premise. For the courts, gender is the defining characteristic of mar-
riage. Any male and female may marry one another, even if they are
both homosexual. Even the more recent Hawaii Supreme Court fo-
cused on gender and not sexuality when it asserted, "it is immaterial
whether the plaintiffs, or any of them, are homosexuals." 3  By defin-
ing marriage to exclude two people of the same gender, the courts
employed a form of statutory construction that directly contradicts a
foundational principle of a free society, namely, that "anything not
prohibited is permitted."24 The older opinions are full of double-talk
and circular logic and, although the Hawaii opinion and the District
of Columbia dissent show some change in view, the more recent cases
(with the exception of Alaska's lower court decision) still rely on the
authority of previous courts as giving credence and stability to those
arguments.2' In general, the judges say both that the states have abso-
lute dominion over marriage and that they, as state court officers, are
powerless to create a more inclusive definition because the roots are re-
ligious and inflexible.26 Courts are sending the message that the purpose
of marital unions is procreation, but having children, planning to have
231. Coolidge, supra note 73, at 8.
232. Coolidge, supra note 73, at 8-9.
233. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 53 n.14.
234. Damslet, supra note 8, at 565-66.
235. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A2d 307, 315-16 (relying on Baker v.
Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); Jones v. Hailhan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky.
1973); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); and others, for sup-
port of its opposite-gender only definition of marriage); Storrs, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 287
(relying on In re Cooper 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 1993), which cited Baker
with approval).
236. See Damsler, supra note 8, at 576.
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children, or being capable of having children is not necessary, as long
as the biological traits of the two partners are those of reproductive
complementarity. Some courts find Griswold v. Connecticut to support
the right of heterosexuals to choose to limit reproduction without ac-
knowledging the reciprocal argument that, if the procreation
component is no longer essential for opposite-gender couples, then
procreation is no longer a valid reason to deny same-gender mar-
riage. 7 Others take judicial notice of the same convoluted reasoning.
More interesting than the illogic employed by the courts in de-
ciding these cases is the emotion behind the strained arguments. A
common thread behind these opinions is the view that these couples'
claims are so preposterous as to only deserve short shrift, exemplified
by the curt dismissal of claims." s No facts are given in these cases
about the relationships of the couples. In fact, their names are rarely
mentioned.29 Although a few of the opinions indicate the dates that
the couples applied for marriage licenses, they focus on the fact that
both partners are of the same gender as the only pertinent fact in the
case. As a well-established legal principle, limiting facts to those that
are material is laudable. However, the message is very strong as to the
lesser importance of the petitioners because of their sexual orientation.
One reads all the earlier opinions and has the feeling that the courts
were on the verge of condemning these cases as just plain silly. Con-
sider the language in Singer v. Hara:
[I]t is apparent from a review of cases dealing with legal
questions arising out of the marital relationship that the
definition of marriage as the legal union of one man and one
woman who are otherwise qualified to enter into the rela-
tionship not only is clearly implied from such cases, but also
was deemed by the court in each case to be so obvious as not
to require recitation.4
237. See Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186-87.
238. See Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186 n.2 ("We dismiss without discussion petitioners'
additional contentions that the statute contravenes the First Amendment and Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution."); Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 590
("[What they propose is not a marriage.").
239. The following cases do not mention the plaintiffs' names even once in the opinion:
Storrs v. Holcomb, 666 N.Y.S.2d 835 (App. Div. 1997); Jones, 501 S.W.2d 588;
Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Sup. Ct. 1996).
240. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1191-92.
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However, by addressing the petitioners' challenges (even while
dismissing the claims), in spite of their obvious errors, the courts may
have extinguished the hopes of other gay couples and discouraged
such claims in the future. In fact, couples did try other avenues and
avoided directly challenging state marriage statutes for nearly twenty
years. Hawaii and Alaska may offer some hope of the extension of the
right to marry to lesbians and gay men, but even these are long shots
when all of the resulting political ruckus, within those states and
across the nation, is taken into consideration. In spite of their losses,
cases like those described above test the climate and provide the ex-
treme demands that make other requests by gay couples seem less
threatening and even quite acceptable.
D. Case Law on Gay Family Issues and Other Legal Protection
Judges across the nation have faced hundreds of other cases
brought by or relating to same-gender couples and their families. For
example, judges have interpreted the cohabitation agreements for
same-gender couples,"' determined custody rights for children of the
relationship upon its dissolution, 242 and ruled on employment or so-
cial benefits for same-gender partners of decedents. 243 These do not
seem to fluster judges as much as requests by lesbians and gay men for
legal marital recognition and accompanying benefits. The response to
these other issues has been mixed. With such a large volume of cases
and issues, this Article will be limited to just a small sample in the ex-
ploration of attitudes which underlie the decisions.
Ironically, the courts are willing to help in the dissolution of the
very relationships that they refuse to recognize as having legal signifi-
cance, as long as the parties have a cohabitation agreement of some
sort. One way in which courts do this is to base the decision on logic
similar to that of Marvin v. Marvin 4 and allow any oral or written
contract to be enforceable to the extent it is severable from an agree-
ment to provide sexual services. 245 While reiterating that no legal rights
241. See, e.g., Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1981).
242. See, e.g., A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
243. See, e.g., Rovirav. AT & T, 817 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
244. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). See supra note 110 and accompanying
text.
245. See, e.g., Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing Marvin as
authority and holding an oral cohabitation agreement between two men enforceable,
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flow to such relationships as a matter of law, these courts find that no
impediment exists to prevent parties from agreeing to provide certain
rights and obligations.246 One court even compared the agreement to a
prenuptial agreement. 247 Other courts review the validity of cohabita-
tion agreements for compliance with required elements of contracts
• • 248
without consideration of the couples' intimate relations. In these
cases, the enforcement may be precluded by the failure to comply with
the statute of frauds or some technical defect.249 If the parties have
made no agreement of any sort, but base their arguments on the
marital nature of their relationship, the court can deny recognition of
any special status based on the inability of such couples to enter into
marriage. 20 Regardless of how the courts decide these cases, they give
attention to the nature and length of the relationship, showing more
respect for the persons involved than the opinions directly addressing
same-gender marriage.
Same-gender couples have sought, mostly unsuccessfully, to ac-
quire economic gains generally allowed only to married persons by
suing third parties for the denial of various benefits. In Rutgers Council
ofAA UP Chapters v. Rutgers,25' the court held that the denial of health
insurance coverage to same-gender domestic partners of employees did
not violate a state law against discrimination, the equal protection
clause of the state constitution, or a state executive order prohibiting
even though parties' sexual relationship was an express part of consideration there-
for"); Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992) (finding contract enforceable as
supported by legal consideration and finding any illegal sexual activity as, at most, in-
cidental to the contract rather than required by it).
246. See, e.g., Posik v. Layton, No. 96-2192, 1997 WL 136208, at *1 (Fla. App. Mar. 27,
1997) (enforcing cohabitation agreement between two women and extending the
Marvin principle to same-gender couples in Florida), cert. denied, 699 So.2d 1374
(Fla. 1997).
247. See Posik, 1997 WL 136208, at *1.
248. See, e.g., Ireland v. Flanagan, 627 P.2d 496 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that the
implicit intent of the parties was to pool their resources and requiring equitable reim-
bursement to one parry upon dissolution of their relationship).
249. See, e.g., Robin v. Cook, N.Y.LJ., Oct. 30, 1990, at 22 (holding the oral agreement
between two women to be in violation of the statute of frauds because it was to last
for the life of one of the parties).
250. See, e.g., Seward v. Mentrup, 622 N.E.2d 756 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (finding no
entitlement to legal or equitable division of couple's combined property in the ab-
sence of marriage or contract); DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1984) (holding that because a male couple could not contract to common-law mar-
riage, the court would not grant a divorce, equitable distribution, or alimony).
251. Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters v. Rutgers, 689 A.2d 828 (N.J. Super, Ct. App.
Div. 1997).
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discrimination in the executive branch on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion.252 Similarly, courts have disallowed pension payments253 and
spouse's elective share under a will254 for gay partners. Yet, a New York
court held that a noneviction provision of the rent control laws in-
cluded the unmarried life partner of a deceased gay male tenant as
well as persons related by blood or law.255 Lawsuits have also been ini-
tiated to allow joint petition for bankruptcy, 256 to increase veteran's
educational benefits, 257 and to change immigration classification.
25 1
One of the higher profile cases concerned medical guardianship
of a severely injured accident victi. 2 9 This story received national
attention because the victim's partner, Karen Thompson, agreed to
the appointment of the victim's father as guardian after both had
cross-petitioned for guardianship. She did so believing that she would
be allowed visitation rights and input into medical decisions. The fa-
ther terminated Karen's visitation rights. She was not allowed to see
the injured woman, Sharon Kowalski, for almost four years, at which
point Sharon had recovered enough to be able to express her desire to
see Karen.260 Karen visited Sharon at the nursing home and was al-
lowed to take her for semi-monthly weekend visits to the home they
252. Rutgers, 689 A.2d at 828.
253. See, e.g., Rovira v. AT&T, 817 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (deeming the de-
ceased employee's same-gender partner and partner's children as ineligible for death
benefits under ERISA-covered pension plan).
254. See, e.g., In re Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 1993) (upholding lower court
decision that the surviving partner of same-gender relationship is not a surviving
spouse within the meaning of statute allowing the surviving spouse to elect against
decedent's will).
255. See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
256. See, e.g., In reAllen, 186 B.tR 769 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995) (disallowing same-gender
couple the right to file joint petition for bankruptcy relief based on their failure to
meet the eligibility requirement that they be married, but refraining from addressing
whether the state's refusal to issue marriage licenses to same-gender couples was un-
constitutional).
257. See, e.g., McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1976) (refusing to grant an
increase in educational benefits to a veteran, who was a petitioner in Baker v. Nelson,
because, although the increase was designed for veterans with dependents, this vet-
eran had a same-gender dependent spouse not legally recognized by the court in
Baker).
258. See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982) (denying male alien
the immigration classification of immediate relative of a citizen because same-gender
marriage did not qualify the alien as the U.S. citizen's spouse).
259. See In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(reversing lower-court decision and holding that the lesbian partner of a brain-injured
automobile accident victim should have been appointed as her guardian).
260. See Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d at 791-92.
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shared before the accident. The most recent court action was in re-
sponse to Sharon's father's request to be relieved as guardian." ' Some
friends and members of the Kowalski family, all of whom had initi-
ated less contact than Karen had with Sharon while she was
institutionalized, opposed Karen's petition for guardianship and won
in the lower court.262 The willingness of Judge Davies to review these
facts in detail shows some compassion and understanding on the part
of the court. To the judge, this case was not about these women's af-
fectational orientation, but was about Karen's commitment and
Sharon's wishes and best interests.263
Child custody and adoption cases require that the court deter-
mine what is in the best interests of the children involved.2
Naturally, this test requires that courts take family relations into con-
sideration. One Massachusetts case discussed the family dynamics in
great detail to support a decision that unmarried cohabitating women,
one of whom was the biological mother of the child, could jointly
265
adopt the child because it was in the child's best interest. Ti c -
struction of adoption statutes, which did not confine the
interpretation of the legislative purpose to the encouragement of tra-
ditional family structures, allowed the court to read the statute in
266
accordance with contemporary experience.
Negligent infliction of emotional distress or bystander distress
and loss of consortium warrant mention. In the landmark case Dillon
267Legg recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress was
predicated on finding that the victim and the plaintiff were closely
261. See Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d at 791.
262. See Kowaski, 478 N.W.2d at 792.
263. See Kowaski, 478 N.W.2d at 797.
264. See, e.g., Bottoms v. Bottoms, No. 2157-96-2, 1997 WL 421218, at *1 (Va. Ct.
App. July 29, 1997) (following Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 345 S.E.2d 10, 11
(1986), stating the standard for deciding issues concerning the custody of children "is
a matter of judicial discretion which courts must exercise with the welfare of the chil-
dren as the paramount consideration"); Recent Case, 107 H~Av. L. Rev. 751, 753-
54 (indicating that many states have directed by statute the best interests test for
adoptions and others have set that standard through case law).
265. See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993). See also In re Adoption of
Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sur. Ct. 1992) (allowing adoption of child by lesbian part-
ner of his biological mother and stating that New York law recognizes that a child's
best interest is not related to the sexual orientation of his or her parents). These two
cases may have been made easier for the judges by the fact that the woman seeking to
adopt in each of these situations was a professional with a high income.
266. See Recent Case, supra note 264, at 752-53.
267. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
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related.268 The definition of "closely related" was given as the opposite
of "an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant
relationship." 9 Some courts have limited this to blood relations
within one or two degrees of consanguinity and legal spouses.27° How-
ever, judges are able to take some license in making this
determination.27' One would think gay and lesbian couples could eas-
ily show evidence to meet the close relationship test without being
married, but the courts are hesitant to recognize their closeness.2 72 As a
matter of policy, the courts shy from an extension to emotionally sig-
nificant, stable, and exclusive relationships, while presuming the
stability of parent/child and husband/wife. 27 3 The reason given by one
court is that to recognize all close relationships would unreasonably
burden all human activity.74 Oddly enough, courts in some states
have determined that families have standing to sue for negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress for the mishandling of a corpse,275 but
have not allowed gay partners to recover for the distress of watching a
living partner be injured. 276 As with negligent infliction of emotional
distress, most judges facing loss of consortium claims are concerned
with the need to limit liability and potential burden on the courts.'
However, unmarried heterosexuals have been successful on a few such
claims, but no same-gender life partner has.278
Even though the courts in all of these cases have allowed some
benefits and denied others, the opinions have given more attention to
the persons involved and the nature of their relationships than the
courts addressing the issue of same-gender marriage. Upon reading
these opinions, one senses some degree of tolerance and recognition
268. Id. at 925.
269. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920.
270. See Coon v. Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873 (Ct. App. 1987) (defining dose relationship
to include parent/child, husband/wife, and common-law husband/wife and refusing
damages to gay male who witnessed an assault on his exclusive life partner).
271. See Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994) (finding a dose relationship be-
tween cohabitating opposite-gender couple engaged to be married).
272. See Coon, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 873; Samuelian v. Town of Coventry, 701 A.2d 814
(MI. 1997) (dismissing case on procedural grounds, court leaves in place the lower
court's decision that state loss of consortium statute does not contemplate suits by
same-gender partners).
273. See Coon, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
274. See Coon, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
275. See, e.g., Contreraz v. Michelotti-Sawyers, 896 P.2d 1118 (Mont. 1995).
276. See, e.g., Coon 237 Cal. Rptr. at 1269.
277. See Raisty, supra note 49, at 2648.
278. See Raisty, supra note 49, at 2648.
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by the courts. These judges show less impatience with what the judges
in the cases discussed earlier apparendy consider to be fanciful indig-
nation on the part of the petitioners. If the injury for which the
petitioners seek relief requires the court to recognize an association
between the parties like marriage or intimacy, the court is more likely
to balk. In DeSanto v. Barnsley,279 a case where a male filed for divorce
from his "common-law husband," the court affirmed the dismissal by
the lower court, differentiating between this situation, where the two
men claimed to be married, and cases where the courts had assisted in
the equitable dissolution of relationships based on contract. 80 Judge
Spaeth said:
If, under the guise of expanding the common law, we were to
create a form of marriage forbidden by statute, we should
abuse our judicial power: our decision would have no sup-
port in precedent, and its practical effect would be to amend
the Marriage Law-something only the Legislature can do.28 '
The award of benefits in some of these suits does accentuate the
difference between a view of same-gender marriages as illegal and that
of same-gender marriages as not provided for by law. If same-gender
marriages were illegal, couples would not be able to make arguments
for any of these marital-type benefits, much less have courts pay heed
and grant some of them. On the other hand, the absence of legal rec-
ognition, albeit negative in so many ways. already discussed, provides
the window for the gradual evolution of the law. By deciding issues
case by case, the court is exposed to individuals. As judges and society
become more comfortable with same-gender relationships through
this exposure, hopefully same-gender marriage will become more ac-
cepted, eventually leading to legal recognition.
In addition to seeking protection for their relationships through
contract as noted above, gay couples have taken other steps to cement
their bond. Some have joined their lives through commitment cere-
monies.82 The adoption of one partner by the other is an attempt to
legitimize their next-of-kin status, as well as an attempt to qualify for
279. DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
280. See id. at 956.
281. DeSanto, 476 A.2d at 956.
282. See Cox, supra note 151, at 27 (discussing the transformative effects of sharing her
commitment ceremony with her students, friends, family, vendors, and all whom the
couple encountered in the planning of the event).
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automatic inheritance. 83 Couples may change one or both of their last
names, rent or buy a home together, open joint bank accounts, draw
up powers of attorney, establish trust accounts, and execute wills."4
These actions are designed to afford greater protection and do so, to
some extent, but none guarantees any greater social or legal respect.
Even though some of these have legal force, they are still susceptible to
attacks by families of origin. At least one court set aside a legally valid
will giving a same-gender lover control over all of the decedent's assets
upon a finding of undue influence." 5 Perhaps the best insurance for
the fulfillment of one's wishes regarding the status of one's partner is
to discuss the relationship with the families of origin, in addition to
taking appropriate legal steps, and to explain expectations for the
treatment of each other in the event of unforeseeable or unplanned
circumstances. Unfortunately, this is not always possible because the
family is unsupportive, in which case the revelation could backfire.
When the court found undue influence in the will construction case
mentioned above, the family of origin of the decedent used a letter he
wrote to them regarding his affections for his lover as proof of undue
influence.286
Perhaps in search of a silver lining, some gay men and lesbians
find minor advantages in the states' refusals to bestow the preferred
status of marriage on their relationships. Most of these "benefits" are
available to any unmarried couple. However, in custody battles over a
child born into a same-gender relationship, lesbians and gay men can
use the state's legal stance on family in a manner that harms the non-
biological parent, the child, and the remainder of the gay and lesbian
community.2" For example, in cases where a lesbian couple with chil-
dren dissolves its commitment, the biological mother may trivialize
283. See HAYDEN CUR Y ET AL., A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY CouvLEs § 1-13
(9th ed. 1993).
284. See CURRY ET AL., supra note 283, at §§ 2-4, 2-8, 2-14, 4-4, 5-6, 5-31.
285. See In re Will of Kaufmann, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664, 684-86 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964),
affid, 204 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1965).
286. See Kaufimann, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 671.
287. See Lorri L Jean, Lesbian Co-Parent Battles Have Repercussions, THE LESBIAN NEws,
Dec. 1996, at 22; Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991)
(holding that lesbian partner was not a parent within the statutory meaning and
could not apply for determination of issue of visitation rights); In re Custody of
H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d 419, 434 (Wis. 1995) (remanding for determination of
whether mother's former lesbian partner has parent-like relationship with the child).
The argument by the biological mother need not expressly invalidate the relationship,
because she may simply rely on her presumptive right to deny visitation.
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the relationship so as to prevent the nonbiological mother any custody
or visitation rights.2 ' This may be more harmful to the community as
a whole because it lends credence to homophobic views and offers
ammunition for future discrimination.289
E. Other Evidence of Social Opinion
Just as judges find it easier to accept same-gender couples if they
are not seeking to align their relationships too closely with heterosexual
marriages, the general public supports equal rights for gay men and les-
290bians while opposing same-gender marriage. 0 In addition to
fundamentally challenging the religiously based morals of some mem-
bers of the public, the extension of marriage status to gay men and
lesbians is viewed as taking away some of the identity of heterosexualsby devaluig their . 291 ,. .
by devaluing their marriages. Marriage symbolically "institutionalizes,
and ritualizes the social meaning of heterosexuality."292 Even though
marriage licenses are not a limited resource (if they were, heterosexuals
would have exhausted the supply by now with so many multiple mar-
riages), heterosexuals fear same-gender marriages would take
something quantifiable from them.293
Without naming the package "marriage," some municipalities,
corporations, associations, unions, schools, and states are willing to
offer partner benefits such as health insurance, bereavement leave, and
288. See Jean, supra note 287, at 22-23; Sara Miles, Jane vs. Jane, OUT, Dec.-Jan. 1998,
at 128, 130-31.
289. See Jean, supra note 287, at 23.
290. See Thomas F. Coleman, The Hawaii Legislature Has Compelling Reasons to Adopt a
Comprehensive Domestic Partnership Act, 5 L. & SaxUALiTy 541, 549 (1995) (asserting
that the general public is opposed to same-gender marriage according to various polls,
but supports domestic partnership rights); Coolidge, supra note 73, at 13 (citing
1996 Hawaii poll showing opposition to same-gender marriage at 71%); Tobisman,
supra note 8, at 118 (referencing 1996 exit poll that showed over half of Americans
believed gay male and lesbian families should have legal protection, but over half also
supported DOMA); Poll Shows Wide Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage, Associated
Press, Aug. 14, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 7437301; Poll Update Newsweek:
Gay Rights Issues, Am. Pol. Network: Hotline, Vol. 10 No. 174, available in
WESTIAW, APN-HO 40.
291. See Mohr, supra note 7, at 106.
292. Mohr, supra note 7, at 106.
293. See Fallon, supra note 8, at 184; Mohr, supra note 7, at 106. See also Same-Sex Mar-
riage: Hearings on S. 1740 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong. (1996)
(Statement of Congressman Steve Largent) available in 1996 WL 387295
(F.D.C.H).
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pension survivor benefits.2 Hawaii offers any two adults who cannot
legally marry the right to share medical insurance, state pensions, and
inheritance rights. 295 The bill also gives the right to sue and to own
property jointly.296 By executive order, New York City established a
system permitting same-gender couples to register as unmarried do-
mestic partners.297 Churches such as the Metropolitan Community
Churches and the Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations
perform same-gender unions,298 but more mainstream churches like
the Episcopal and United Methodist denominations have defeated
proposals to perform such ceremonies. 299 Whether law influences so-
cial opinion or public outcry changes the law is not as significant as
the substance of each message. A willingness to accept and recognize
gay and lesbian unions stops just short of calling them marriages. Ig-
noring this fact does not aid the cause of same-gender couples. The
better approach is to accept it and move gradually toward changing
the prejudices behind the opinion poll numbers.
IV. How LEGALIZATION MIGHT CHANGE VIEWS OF GAY COUPLES
"[E]ven marriage doesn't have the same meaning anymore. "'oo
If same-gender marriages were legalized today, the dynamics dis-
cussed above, which developed over many years, would not simply
reverse or disappear. Over time, gay men and lesbians may come to
view their own relationships with greater legitimacy. They likely
would lose some privacy in the process as their families became more
294. See Knight, supra note 11, at 109 (naming numerous cities, including Seattle, Madi-
son, and San Francisco, and corporations, induding Levi-Strauss, Apple, and Time
Warner, that have extended benefits to same-gender partners and indicating several
universities that have opened family housing to gay families); Tobisman, supra note
8, at 116 (indicating that over 30 municipalities, a number of major corporations,
universities, the California Bar Association, and Vermont have extended certain
benefits to domestic partners).
295. See 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 383.
296. See 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 383.
297. See Damslet, supra note 8, at 561.
298. See Damslet, supra note 8, at 561.
299. See Cecile S. Holmes, Methodist Council Affirms Stance Against Gay Unions as Church
Law, HousToN CHRON., Aug. 12, 1998, at 10; Gay Marriages Rejected: Supporters
Encouraged by Episcopal Church's Narrow Defeat of Proposal to Recognize Union of
Same-Sex Couples, LUBBOcKAvALANCHE-JoURNAL, July 20, 1997, at 5A.
300. Spoken by Karen Wright, in THE CHrLDREN's Hour (Mirisch Co. 1961).
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visible and churches, courts, employers, and schools became more in-
volved in the workings of their homes. They might rely more heavily
on the system and others than on themselves to provide the support
necessary to sustain lorig-term commitments.
More gay men and lesbians would likely make themselves known,
including those who have been hiding their relationships, those who
have chosen to live their lives celibate, and those who have masquer-
aded as heterosexual. 0 ' Whether this would be considered a social
cost302 of the legalization of marriage turns on which social outcome
one considers more valuable-encouraging persons to conform at any
personal sacrifice or freeing all to learn, unabashedly, who they are
and live as whom they discover themselves to be. The social influence
of homosexual couples on the children they raise is unclear,"3 but the
nature and nurture arguments of the origin of sexual orientation are
both implicated because some couples adopt (environmental influence
only) and others have children through assisted conception or surro-
gate delivery (environmental and genetic influence). Naturally,
rational minds differ as to how legalization could affect gay couples
and the institution of marriage.
Would marriage make same-gender relationships more stable as it
purports to do for opposite-gender couples? Or, would same-gender
marriages strike a fatal blow to the foundation of the institution as
some commentators discussed above fear? Four different arguments
can be made analyzing the impact of same-gender marriage on the
institution of marriage itself. For some, "[mlarriage converts houses
into homes, the consumption of food into customs of nurturance, and
sex into filiation" creating an "intersection of gayness and the everyday
at marriage. '300 The status of marriage, therefore, can "promote inti-
macy because it's attentive to the ways in which intimate relationships
301. Cf Arthur A. Murphy & John P. Ellington, Homosexuality and the Law: Tolerance
and Containment II, 97 DicK. L. Rav. 693, 706 (1993)(advocating against changes
in the law that imply state approval of homosexual unions which could lead to an in-
crease in homosexual behavior).
302. See Elizabeth Kristol, The Marrying ind, in THE MoRAL AND LEGAL DEBATE, supra
note 7, at 132, 135.
303. See Kristol, supra note 302, at 135 (suggesting that sexual orientation is not immune
from social influence); Jonathan Pickhardt, Choose or Lose: Embracing Theories of
Choice in Gay Rights Litigation Strategies, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 921, 934-37 (1998)
(discussing scientific studies which indicate genetic factors play a key part in deter-
mining sexual orientation).
304. Mohr, supra note 7, at 106.
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can be constitutive of one's sense of self."05 In other words, status
provides a unified sense of self for each partner that guides them as a
couple through changes in sentiment which occur in long-term com-
mitments. °6  Although gay men and lesbians in committed
relationships "score high on scales designed to measure attachment,
caring and intimacy," " they generally experience fewer acts of support
from family and friends that help promote durability in heterosexual
unions. Customs such as wedding showers, ceremonies, honeymoons,
anniversary congratulations and parties, and shared mail addressed
with reciprocal tides seem so common to be without much impact,
but offer regular and ritualized reminders of promises made. Legaliza-
tion of same-gender marriage would thus strengthen homosexual
relationships. On a different side of the debate stand those who be-
lieve that same-gender marriage would uproot marriage all together.
Together stand those who worry about the symbolic drain of what
they consider to be the significant meaning (i.e., "heterosexual") at-
tributed to marriage and those who fear moral degradation of family
life. The latter arguments focus on gay promiscuity, but commenta-
tors cannot agree as to whether studies actually support that
stereotype.3t3 Theoretically, any existing promiscuity would be elimi-
nated by the social reinforcement and imposition of self-restraint and
fidelity that accompanies the higher status.309 That is dependent, of
course, on the willingness of gay and lesbian couples to accept an ex-
clusive model for sexual relations.
310
Two other sides to the issue are expressed by those lesbians and
gay men who believe same-gender couples have new insights and les-
sons to teach heterosexuals' and by those authors who feel the
fluidity of defining marriage and family would be compromised by
buying into the traditional paradigm. Interestingly, gender provides
305. REGAN, supra note 3, at 89.
306. See REGAN, supra note 3, at 89.
307. REGAN, supra note 3, at 120.
308. Compare Knight, supra note 11, at 116 (asserting that "an enormous body of re-
search" supports this characterization), with Maguire, supra note 76, at 66 (claiming
that studies do not support a conclusion that homosexuals are more promiscuous
than heterosexuals).
309. See REGAN, supra note 3, at 120.
310. See Mohr, supra note 10, at 233-34 (suggesting gay men may select alternate expres-
sions of commitment and sacrifice, rendering sexual exclusivity less significant in
marriage and love).
311. See Mohr, supra note 10, at 233-34.
312. See Christensen, supra note 162, at 1303, 1317.
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a general, albeit not absolute, cultural dividing line between these
views. Some gay men assert the view that same-gender couples offer
relief from the unnecessary focus on monogamy and provide new
models for showing love and commitment.3  Other improvements
include: 1) the acceptance of the principle that a committed union
evolves over time with the relationship itself creating a third partner;
and 2) the more effective incorporation of friendship, into the model
for romantic coupling. 4 Some lesbians, on the other hand, claim
marriage is inherently patriarchal and, therefore, to accept it as'a
model for their lives would cause domestication and force assimilation
into the mainstream." 5 Resistance would be futile, presumably. The
bottom line is that it is difficult to predict exactly what psychological
and sociological effects the legalization of same-gender marriage
would have in the long-run, but certainly some changes would occur
both to lesbian and gay couples and to the establishment.
Similarly, many new benefits would be available to same-gender
pairs, but the extent of material, presumptive, and preferential rewards
that would be bestowed upon gays as they entered the hegemony is
not clear. A grocery list of selectable items (including many previously
discussed) illustrates the potentially vast impact. Benefits currently
guaranteed by marital status touch the following areas: 1) federal and
state income taxation; 2) independent retirement account employ-
ment status exceptions; 3) Social Security survivor benefits; 4)
unemployment compensation; 5) immigration preferences; 6) testi-
monial privileges; 7) loss of consortium, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, or wrongful death causes of action; 8) intestate
succession claims and elective share rights; 9) estate and gift tai ex-
emptions; 10) child support and visitation rights; 11) medical
emergency guardianship; 12) health, life, and dental insurance; 13)
legalization of sexual acts; 14) adoption and foster parenting; 15) be-
reavement and dependent care leave; 16) paternity (or the equivalent)
presumptions; 17) community property; 18) equitable dissolution;
19) university family dorm housing access; 20) jail visitation; 21)
country club family memberships; and 22) travel and other commer-
313. See, Mohr, supra note 10, at 233-34; see also Sullivan, supra note 10, at 130.
314. See Mohr, supra note 10, at 233-35; see also Sullivan, supra note 10, at 130.
315. See Cain, supra note 145, at 72; Etteibrick, supra note 9, at 119-20.
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316
cial discounts. Certainly, all of these benefits do not attach immedi-
ately to legalization because many are privately subsidized.
Finally, some thinly veiled dangers and complexities would neces-
sarily follow any action by the courts or legislature to give legal
recognition to gay families. These must be anticipated and softened
where possible. The legalization of same-gender marriage before social
opinion supports such a move could expose gay men and lesbians who
receive licenses to increased hate acts and discrimination.317 Just as the
military policy of "don't ask, don't tell, don't pursue" has increased
witch hunts and harassment,1 8 the much higher degree of mandated
acceptance found in legalized same-gender marriage would inspire
backlash in every form. One look at the response to Baehr v. Lewin'"
in Hawaii and in legislative chambers and voting booths across the
nation highlights the political gay-bashing possible when the public is
so threatened. When an issue is brought before it, a court must decide
it based on law and not "private biases" and possible injury.2° The
court's responsibility to do so is no reason to deny or downplay the
reality of danger. The courts may become the complaining grounds
for those who are materially and morally injured.3 1' The legislature
316. See Carl, supra note 148, at 53; Christensen, supra note 162, at 1321 n.123; Anthony
C. Infanti, Baehr v. Lewin: A Step in the Right Direction for Gay Rights?, 4 L. & SExu-
ALrry 1, 4 (1994); Tobisman, supra note 8, at 113.
317. Backlash reminiscent of that following desegregation (and continuing today) could be
expected. Just as with other forms of discrimination, the fear of heightened harass-
ment is not alone sufficient to stop social progress. However, unlike others who are
subject to discrimination, the legalization of same-gender marriage may expose those
who are now protected by their invisibility. The legalization of same-gender marriage
could be dangerous if it creates the appearance of acceptance and safety, encouraging
reticent couples to come out and marry, but really exposing them to violent responses
by members of society.
318. See Editorial, The Spirit of "Don't Ask Don't Telg "ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 23,
1998, at 16A; Michelle Benecke, Military Lesbian-Baiting & Witchhunting Intensifies,
THE LEsBrAN NEws, Dec. 1996, at 21.
319. See supra notes 201-09 and accompanying text.
320. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
321. Cases have been brought before the courts by persons and entities forced to provide
benefits under domestic partnership plans and by persons who felt limitations on per-
sonal freedom as a result of gay rights legislation. See Lilly v. City of Minneapolis,
527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding, in suit brought by a taxpayer,
that city council resolutions granting healthcare benefits to same-gender domestic
partners were without legal effect); Presbytery of N.J. of the Orthodox Presbyterian
Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454 (3d Cit. 1994) (holding, in declaratory action
brought by pastor and church, that complaint was ripe for consideration of whether
state anti-discrimination laws would allow state to prosecute pastor if he spoke out
against homosexual acts).
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may become consumed with the consideration of reactionary legisla-
tion.322 These are examples of some heterosexuals' incredible territorial
possessiveness over the marriage domain, and proponents of same-
gender marriages must walk lightly for their own safety and in order
to be successful overall in the fight for the legalization of same-gender
marriage.
Several significant conflicts which are beyond the scope of this
Article would arise if the Hawaii Supreme Court were to rule in favor
of the same-gender couples. They include conflicts between courts and
legislatures, between states, and, possibly, between the United States
and other countries.3z2 The full faith and credit implications go further
than just constitutional application across the nation, they go across
time. If the couple vows to love and support one another for life, the
state must reciprocate by honoring the relationship for its duration.
Consideration of the net benefits goes well beyond the rights of the
lesbians and gay men who seek validation of their relationships. The
ripple effect touches many lives, many customs, and many private and
public institutions.
CONCLUSION
The ordering of families involves the public grant of legal protec-
tion based on status and the public and private recognition and
acceptance of family identity. 24 The two are so inextricable that the
grudging willingness of society to tolerate same-gender couples, call-
ing themselves married and receiving social benefits, cannot achieve
complete equality. Society must be ready to accept same-gender mar-
riage as "an acknowledgment that gayness, like loving and caring, is a
relational property, a connection between persons, a human bonding,
322. One federal example is the Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West
Supp. 1997). Also, "[flrom June 1994 to February 1997, at least nineteen states
amended their marriage laws to ban or strengthen existing laws banning same-sex
marriage." Coolidge, supra note 73, at 97.
323. See Coleman, supra note 290, at 551-61. For a complete discussion of the full faith
and credit implications, see Anthony Dominic D'Amato, Note, Conflict of Laws Rules
and the Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 911
(1995); Mark Strasser, Judicial Good Faith and the Baehr Essentiah: On Giving Credit
Where It's Due, 28 RUTGERs L.J. 313 (1997); Strasser, Loving the Romer Out for
Baehr, supra note 102.
324. See Christensen, supra note 162, at 1364-5.
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one in need of tendance and social concern." 325 Political, social, and
religious reform that endures is gradual. Thrusting same-gender mar-
riages to the top of the hierarchy of coupledom alongside opposite-
gender marriage is simply too much at one time, for gay men and les-
bians, and for society. For now, the. discussion of the recognition and
support of same-gender relationships should focus on programs such
as domestic partnerships, avoiding the symbolic transformation of
marriage.
Domestic partnership benefits are a product of the marketplace.
As such, they are limited by the company's or municipality's choices
as to whom to recognize as "domestic partners" and as to the ingredi-
ents in the benefits package.3 2' Also, they are tied generally to
employment and, therefore, result in economic and skill discrimina-
tion against couples who cannot afford to make job choices based on
benefit options.329  State-legislated domestic partnership packages
could be tailored to provide the degree of benefits acceptable to each
state's majority and could extend benefits beyond the workplace.
In addition to domestic partnership benefits, some cities have set
up registries for same-gender partners. 3  These provide little more
than the opportunity to be on public record as a couple. Even with
limited concrete benefit, a transformative power does come from the
visibility of a "fortified presence of open lesbians and gay men.)331
Fortunately, the trend in case law and the employment market-
place is toward greater provision of benefits and recognition for same-
gender couples. The recent surge is a positive indication of changing
325. Mohr, supra note 10, at 239.
326. For further discussion of domestic partnerships and their structure, see Coleman,
supra note 290, at 541, et. seq.; Deborah M. Henson, A Comparative Analysis of
Same-Sex Partnership Protections, in SAmE-SEx MARRIAGE supra note 9, at 42; Ray-
mond C. O'Brien, Domestic Partnership: Recognition and Responsibiliv, 32 SAN
DIEGO L. Rnv. 163 (1995). For an excellent discussion of the political impact as well
as the structure of domestic partnerships, see Nancy J. Knauer, Domestic Partnership
and Same-Sex Relationships: A Marketplace Innovation and a Less than Perfect Institu-
tional Choice, 7 TEMP. PoL & Civ. RTs. L REv 337 (1998)(evaluating the strategic
institutional options for moving toward recognition of same-gender couples).
327. See Knauer, supra note 326, at 337-38.
328. See Knauer, supra note 326, at 338-39.
329. See Knauer, supra note 326, at 338, 359.
330. See Knauer, supra note 326, at 340-41.
331. Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay
Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. Rnv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 567,
597 (1995) (translating lessons to be learned from the efforts to end discrimination in
the military to the legalization of marriage).
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attitudes, but is also a reason for caution. The flooding of benefits and
exposure could cause a political backlash like that experienced after
the 1993 Baehr v. Lewin decision.332 As long as society is supportive of
domestic partnership plans and registries, now is the time to cement
their validity with legislation, rather than relying on the more progres-
sive, but less secure or inclusive, whims of the marketplace.
Admittedly, to stop at domestic partnership and registry legisla-
tion when the tide may support more is a conservative step, but would
provide benefits across income levels to same-gender couples in the
interim between now and the legislation of same-gender marriages.
The step would present a less threatening opportunity for opposite-
gender couples to adjust to the idea of sharing marital status, recog-
nizing they lose little by extending benefits to same-gender couples.33
Also, the legislation of domestic partnerships and registration would
allow the gay and lesbian community an opportunity for discussion
and consensus-building regarding the ideal of marriage.334 Any back-
lash would be cushioned by the already increasing market and social
support for same-gender domestic partnership benefits. One author
suggests that domestic partnerships, in this way, will move society to-
ward the even broader goal of the normalization of same-gender
affectional orientation.335
Same-gender marriage has more to do with the institution of
marriage and how it affects our understanding of ourselves and others
than it does with gay rights. Therefore, quests for its legalization must
first seize the chance to discuss the process of change in American law
and society before we can make thoughtful revisions that reflect our
social views, reclaim the tradition of marriage, and open the door to
same-gender couples. This Article is an invitation to that discussion. t
332. See supra notes 201-09 and accompanying text.
333. See Knauer, supra note 326, at 348.
334. See Knauer, supra note 326, at 352.
335. See Knauer, supra note 326, at 349.
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